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Strike Situation in Tirana, Korce, Durres

AU2201165891

[Editorial Report] Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian at 1430 GMT on 22 January carries a total of 12 minutes of reports on strikes in various parts of the country.

The announcer states: "The trade union organization and the Institute of (?Economic) Studies have sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers Party," which "appeals to all political and social organizations that have called for a suspension of strikes and demands for wage increases until 1 May" and "expresses concern at the situation created in the capital by the strike of transportation workers, and the discussions for the preparation of other strikes. What most concerns us is not the absence of buses, because people can walk to work, but the very serious fact that, even after this just and joint appeal, (?there are further) destabilizing (?phenomena) that are leading to anarchy. If all parties and political organizations [words indistinct], we are sure that the workers class will respond conscientiously and with a high sense of responsibility. Because the bus drivers' strike had been announced a few days' previously, it seems that neither the parties and social organizations nor the organs of the state are properly mobilized and have not done made proper efforts to appeal to the bus drivers' consciences."

A trade union aktiv in a chrome mine in Mat District is reported as sending a telegram to Ramiz Alia, pledging hard work, and stating: "Comrade Ramiz, it is true that in our daily work we also have difficulties not only in our difficult underground work, but with certain shortcomings and problems in working and living conditions, housing, and transportation. We miners, however, know the economy's problems and difficulties, and we do not agree with but deplore the behavior of all those collectives that have dropped tools and stopped production."

Genc Kondi, press spokesman for the Council of Ministers, is reported as having stated that "The Tirana passenger transportation workers resumed work at lunch today, and services will be normal tomorrow." "The workers at the Kavaje nut and bolt factory promised to start work at once, after learning of the government's efforts to secure raw materials for their enterprise. Government spokesman Genc Kondi stated that the Council of Ministers welcomed the decision of the workers at these two enterprises to end their strikes. This creates conditions for a fruitful dialogue to solve their problems."

Sokol Perihati interviews the director of the Tirana passenger transportation enterprise, who states that bus drivers have agreed to return to work subject to "dialogue with a government commission which will consider wage increases."

In a recorded interview, the director of the Korce freight transportation enterprise states: "After a week-long strike, the workers and drivers of the Korce freight transportation enterprise resumed work today."

In a largely indistinct telephone report from Elbasan, steelworkers are reported has having demanded "higher pay and shorter working hours."

Durres correspondent Vangjel Dushi states that "Durres District collectives have tightened discipline, organization, and order at work, but this fine atmosphere of work has not prevailed among the stevedores at the docks, whose strike has entered its seventh day. The dock manager [name indistinct] states that many of their demands have been met, such as those for better working conditions and bonuses for preparing ships faster than planned. The workers, however, are demanding wage increases beyond all possibilities, despite the government's explanation that there can be no wage increases that are not earned through work and overfulfilling targets. Many meetings have been held to discuss the problems raised by the workers, but the workers have so far not resumed work. This has caused major economic damage. Many workers from the grain procurement and processing enterprises are urgently demanding the delivery of imported grain."

Durres, Other Strikes End

AU2201213391 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Government Spokesman Genc Kondi reports that the working people of the seaport and the railroad engineering shop in Durres, who had gone on strike, began their work normally today. So did the drivers of the Korce truck pool. In the Tirana bus garages, drivers are restarting their buses with the aim of restoring a normal service tomorrow. Representatives of the Kavaje nut and bolt factory promised in the name of their collective to resume work immediately, after being informed of the concrete efforts being made by the government to secure raw materials for their enterprise. The spokesman announced that the Council of Ministers welcomes the decision of working people to resume work. Only in this way can conditions be created for a fruitful dialogue which will contribute to solving the problems of the entire people.

'Unrest' Reported at Sarande PDSh Rally

AU2101141391 Tirana International Service in German 1330 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Unattributed report from the "Albanian Press Review"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Another article in the same newspaper [BASHKIMI] concerns another very disturbing problem for the country, the large numbers of Albanian citizens leaving the country illegally across the Albanian-Greek border. The article's author believes that this social phenomenon of members of our society

thoughtlessly turning their backs on their homeland further burdens their families, the fate of the nation, and national unity.

The paper TIRANA writes about the need for better supplies to the people. It writes that, despite all the familiar problems, every opportunity is available to significantly improve the citizens' supplies of food. Supplies to the food stores are continuing without interruption, the newspaper writes, and some people's panic-buying of food beyond their normal needs is exaggerated. Large amounts of food will be imported. [passage omitted]

The press also reports the most recent rally of the Democratic Party of Albania [PDSh] in Sarande. This resulted in unrest, because some elements broke the regulations and twice interrupted the rally. In his speech, one of the founding members of the PDSh called for prudence and moderate behavior, and said that anybody who disturbs the peace belongs neither to the Albanian Workers Party nor the PDSh. The rally had to be dispersed. There are, however, no reports of material damage. [passage omitted]

Malile Interviewed on Upcoming Visit to PRC

AU2201141091 Tirana ATA in English 0943 GMT 22 Jan 91

["We Should Go Towards Europe Without Neglecting the Relations of Interest With Other States—Reis Malile's Interview to 'ZERI I POPULLIT'"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, January 22 (ATA)—On the eve of his visit to the PR of China, the foreign minister of the PSR [People's Socialist Republic] of Albania, Reis Malile, says among others in his interview to the newspaper "ZERI I POPULLIT":

The visit of an Albanian delegation to this country has a complex character, both of political and economic importance. The visit to China is in the interest of our foreign policy as well as of the internal one. We should go towards Europe without neglecting also the relations with the other states beyond our continent, which are of interest to us. These are immediate and long-term interests.

One should bear in mind that the existing relations with China have left their traces in our economy, which today is in need of raw materials, replacement of the existing technology, etc. Over the last ten-year period China has assumed fresh developments. I think that first of all of great value is the volume of operative exchanges with China, which has marked an increase of about 40 million dollars annually. On the other hand, our goods are marketed in China and it has been very correct in handling the goods included in the protocol on goods' exchanges for 1990 within the set schedules.

To be mentioned is the construction of the new urea plant in Fier which was realised in a record time, 6 months ahead of schedule,the import of 1,000 tractors for agriculture in the last year. We have also signed a contract for the creation of a joint Albanian-Chinese enterprise for the production of mechanical, hydro appliances.

In July last year,in the first session of the joint commission for the economic and technical cooperation with China, the protocol on the reconstruction and completion of 7 important projects constructed by the Chinese was signed. Over our visit to China we do not exclude the possibility of taking credits of various kinds for raw materials in different branches of industry, in that of construction, chemical, food stuff, etc.

First Indications of Gulf-Related Terrorism

AU2101141691 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 18 Jan 91 p 8

[Plamen Enchev report: "Wave of Telephone Terrorism Engulfs Country"]

[Text] A vehicle with Iraqi registration plates, parked in front of the Israeli Embassy in Sofia, prompted the complete evacuation of the embassy. The special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have checked the rather old vehicle, and did not find any explosives. This was announced by Ivan Kolev, head of the Operational-Technical Department for the Struggle Against Terrorism at a news conference in Sofia.

This is the first sign of probable terrorism in our country, in relation to the Persian Gulf conflict.

In the last two months, 60 cases of telephone terrorism were registered in Sofia. Last year there were 46 telephone calls in Varna, seven in Ruse, and five in Pleven, in which threats related to explosives have been made. Fortunately, no explosives were found in any of the cases, Ivan Boyadzhiev, deputy commander of the Operational-Technical Information Service at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, said.

At a meeting with the leadership of the Committee on Communication and Information, representatives of the antiterrorist services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were assured that they will be given assistance to establish the identity of the anonymous telephone callers. One of these individuals of public order has been caught and Mr. Boyadzhiev hopes that the television will soon show him. Unfortunately, our legislation is not prepared to deal with this wave of telephone terrorism that has engulfed the country in recent months. Disconnecting the telephone is the maximum penalty so far for such a violation.

The special services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs treat every case of telephone threat as as real, and acts accordingly. In 1990 the services were involved in nine cases of real explosions in the country.

Deputy Interior Minister on Hijacking Incident

AU2201101491 Sofia BTA in English 2215 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Burgas, January 21 (BTA)—After the successful outcome of the incident with the aircraft of the Soviet Aeroflot which was hijacked today, General Krasimir Samandzhiev [name as received], deputy minister of the interior, gave some details to the BTA correspondent.

Today at 1230 hrs. the Balkan Airlines company was informed that a TU-154 of Aeroflot was forced to fly over Bulgaria's territory. After clarifying the circumstances a governmental commission was formed comprising representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Soviet diplomatic mission in Bulgaria. Forty-five minutes after the refusal of the Turkish authorities to accept the aircraft in their territory, a swat team arrived at the Airport of Burgas. The first contact with the hijacker was established at 1630 hrs. Only one hour later he was persuaded to surrender to the law enforcement units. The hijacker, Gennadiy Yuryevich Gan, is a citizen of the Soviet Union and a recidivist released from prison on November 16, 1990. He was born in 1955 in the region of Novosibirsk. The hijacker who refuses to state his motives for this act of terrorism says he is suffering from a mental disease. The passengers confirmed that he took some pills all the time while on board the plane. "The explosive materials" that forced the plane to land in Burgas turned out to be a well packed flask of eau de cologne. His statement that he had two accomplices on board the plane also proved to be a bluff. Anyway, the terrorist act caused trouble to 156 passengers, five children included, and to the 8-member crew of the plane headed by Aleksey Nikolayevich Mol.

At the request of the passengers the aircraft will leave for Odessa at about 21 hrs. this evening.

Zhelev Meets Kuwaiti Envoy, Expresses Support

AU2101154991 Sofia BTA in English 1425 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 21 (BTA)—President of the Republic Zhelyu Zhelev received the Kuwaiti ambassador Talib Jalal an-Naqib at his request. The ambassador said that he has come as a special envoy of the Amir of Kuwait Sheik Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah to express his gratitude and respect for the president's declaration concerning the outbreak of military activities in the Persian Gulf region and for Bulgaria's firm support for Kuwait from the very beginning of the Iraqi aggression.

Dr. Zhelev assured the ambassador that Bulgaria's stand on the issue is not dictated by conjuncture considerations and that it will remain the same throughout the conflict, till the liberation of Kuwait. The president said that Bulgaria is willing to contribute to the restructuring of Kuwait when the aggression is over and expressed one again his hope that the war will be as brief and bloodless as possible.

Dr. Zhelev sent his best regards to the Amir of Kuwait.

SDS Council Condemns Lithuanian Action

AU2001203491 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 15 Jan 91 p 1

[Declaration of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces; place and date not given]

[Text] The Coordinating Council of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] expresses a united stance for the united Bulgarian parliamentary opposition and all the parties and organizations making up the SDS: The Soviet troop invasion into Lithuania is a dangerous resurgence of Stalinism, and of the practice of repressing the natural right of every people to self-determination

through the use of brutal military force. This is a threat to the democratic processes not only in those republics that are obtaining their sovereignty through popular vote, but also for all of us who until recently formed the so-called "socialist camp."

The pupils of Lenin, Stalin, and Brezhnev have not properly learned the lessons of 1990: That there cannot be world peace if even a small country has lost its freedom and if its citizens suffer from foreign oppression. By implementing his presidential decree, Mikhail Gorbachev risks wiping out his authority as one of the initiators of "perestroyka," and risks joining the ranks of a number of persons in history with unenviable reputations. There is still time to prevent this from happening, and we, as leaders of the Bulgarian opposition, call upon the president of the USSR to reconsider his decision and to stop the raids in the Baltic region, Georgia, and everywhere else where freedom and democracy are seeking new roads to human happiness.

In response to the appeals by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania, to world public opinion, we express the full support of democratic Bulgarian citizens for the Lithuanian people's just fight for national autonomy.

We call upon the Presidency, the Grand National Assembly, and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria to state their viewpoints on the conflict and to define their positions "for" or "against" democracy. We also address this appeal to all the political forces in the country.

Army Daily on Mitsotakis Visit; Greek Ties

AU2201105191 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 14 Jan 91 p 4

[Senior Lieutenant Krasimir Uzunov article: "Strong, Unambiguous, and Sincere"]

[Text] Strong, unambiguous and sincere—these are the three characteristic features of Bulgarian-Greek friendship newly confirmed by the meeting between the two countries that ended on Saturday, 12 January 1991 in Sofia.

Actually, there is a new element that distinguished the first official contacts of prime ministers Dimitur Popov and Konstandinos Mitsotakis. Over many years we were used to the phrase instilled in us that our relations with Greece set an "example for relations between two countries belonging to different social systems," and that we should not ask for more.

Today the ideological and blo barriers are already a thing of the past. It is a fact that our young democracy needs the assistance of Greece. We also need the experience of our neighbors in the field of the market economy, so we may successfully rescue our suffering economy from the crisis.

The Greek prime minister's visit to Sofia confirmed that there are no disputed issues between Bulgaria and Greece, that our mutual friendship is reciprocal, and has even been intensified, despite the delicate situation that our country is involved in today. Compared with the past, the trends of our political and economic cooperation are far more specific and realistic today. Mr. Mitsotakis was not only the first foreign government leader who addressed the members of the Bulgarian legislature. As usual, he was the first to assume the specific commitment to support our country in its approach to the European community so that it may obtain the necessary assistance. He also announced the economic aid which Bulgaria can expect from Greece. The reciprocal feelings of the two peoples for each other are even more important than the amounts of money, foodstuffs, and medicines. Mutual trust, respect, and understanding are more important than anything else. Irrespective of the changes in the political situations, in the political moods, and processes underway in the European countries, which do not recognize any borders, we nevertheless are living together in the Balkans, at the border of different religions and civilizations.

Mr. Mitsotakis's Sofia visit, the meetings, and talks he held, the recent contacts between the military commands of our two armies in Athens, and the forthcoming visit of the Greek Defense Minister Yoannis Varvitsiotis to our country are steps along the path of expanding confidence, of consolidating security and defense. The Bulgarian-Greek cooperation in the military sector should not be separated from the context of our comprehensive relations. It should not be regarded as a threat to the security of the other Balkan states.

This was also confirmed by the two prime ministers during their news conference at the People's Palace of Culture.

In answering the question of an Arab journalist, the Greek prime minister stated that an Athens-Sofia axis actually exists and the "relations with Sofia cannot be compared to relations with any other Balkan capital, despite the existent striving for a future development of relations with other neighbors."

Referring to certain rumors, the journalists directly asked the question about the possible signing of a nonaggression pact between Bulgaria and Greece. Quite correctly Mr. Mitsotakis pointed out that relations between our countries being what they are totally exclude the requirement for signing such a treaty. Along with this, the negotiations in the sphere of miltiary cooperation and defense are expected to be pursued. The exchange of information, the clear and transparent relations, and the mutual guarantee of national security are the chief elements of this cooperation.

In summing up the political and economic results of the Sofia visit, (the Greek prime minister was accompanied by businessmen from Athens and Northern Greece), we can confirm the general assessment that mutual relations between our two countries represent a stabilizing factor in one of Europe's controversial zones. In the process of

creating all-European structures the Athens-Sofia axis might be the channel through which the spirit of united Europe will reach our peninsula.

Kurdish Leader Arrives for Political Discussions

AU1901201191 Sofia BTA in English 1931 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 19 (BTA)—"A meeting is soon to be held in Paris between representatives of the main political forces in the Kurd national movement," said in an interview for the BTA Mr. Salah Bahredin, secretary general of the Kurd People's Union, [name and title as received] who has arrived in Bulgaria for talks with representatives of the key Bulgarian political parties.

"The war in the Persian Gulf will entirely change the realities in the Middle East. From the very beginning of the crisis there has been an upheaval in the Kurd national movement which has led to the establishment of its main body. We have also shaped our strategy for the period of the crisis. Our prime goal is to establish contacts with the circles directly responsible for taking political decisions in Europe, the United States and the Arab world. We will try to persuade them to include the Kurdish national issue on the agenda of possible future negotiations for peace or a conference on Middle East problems. Geographically, our cause is inextricably bound up with this region. That is why it is necessary that we deepen our relations with the democratic movements in the Arab world, Iran and Turkey. We need to co-ordinate our activities since there are a number of possible solutions to the Gulf crisis.

The lands of Kurdistan are within the combat zone. The Kurds need urgent aid and that is why we seek to establish contacts with the Red Cross and other European relief organizations.

The participants in the Paris meeting will focus their attention on the priorities of the new strategy in our political struggle.

Bank Chief Requests German Debt Deferral

AU1801214391 Sofia BTA in English 2116 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 18 (BTA)—Prof. Todor Vulchev, governor of the National Bank of Bulgaria, today announced that Bulgaria has requested a two-year deferral of payments due to German lending institutions. After a meeting with the visiting director of Deutsche Bank Mr. Klaus Wret, Mr. Vulchev made it clear that in the intervening period a foreign debt repayment strategy will be devised that would restore Bulgaria's credibility with German bankers.

Deutsche Bank is Bulgaria's principal creditor. Mr. Klaus Wret told his host that while no bank was now inclined to make even one dollar loan to Bulgaria, no creditor wants his debtor to go bankrupt, either.

Kozloduy Nuclear Plant Generator Reactivated

AU1901140491 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Text] At 0600 this morning the No. 5 unit at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant was put back into operation. The defect in one of the sensors controlling the generators was corrected. At 1100 the unit developed an output of 700 megawatts. In accordance with the procedure for loading the reactor, there will now be a wait of three hours, and if, as expected, the unit reaches its full output of 1,000 megawatts this afternoon, one may expect that the electricity consumption restrictions will be lifted today or tomorrow.

At the Varna thermoelectric power plant, the generating unit that had been shut down previously was also connected in parallel to the network a short time ago. According to duty officer Radomir Vasilev, at the moment the Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6 generating units are operating at full capacity, which will provide sufficient electric power for the Satudrday's requirements. There are no interruptions in the fuel deliveries to the power plant.

New Oil Deliveries From USSR Announced

AU1801172991 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Jan 91 p 1

[Boris Kostadinov report: "We Will Receive 1,500,000 Tons More Oil Products In Excess of the Agreement"]

[Text] As early as during the second half of February 1991, 120,000 tons of fuel will be delivered from the Soviet Union, Khristo Drenkarov, director general of the "Petrol" Company announced yesterday. This delivery is part of the 1.5 million tons of processed petrochemical products that are guaranteed by an agreement between "Petrol" and the "Aspro" Bulgarian-Soviet shareholder's company.

This amount exceeds the deliveries envisaged by the intergovernmental agreement signed between Bulgaria and the USSR and included the commitment of transporting the fuel, according to the director general of the Bulgarian Fleet. Most of the first delivery will be fuel oil.

According to Khristo Drenkarov, 1.5 million tons of processed petrochemical products will actually cover 20 percent of the the country's normal needs. The fuel will be paid for in rubles. The director general stated that compared with the proposals of numerous other countries and companies, cooperation with the Soviet Union is the most important and necessary for our country.

BSP Supreme Council Position on Agrarian Bill

AU2101204791 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 12 Jan 91 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "Political Stand of the Presidium of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council on the Bill on Owning and Utilizing Agrarian Land"]

[Text] The Bill on Owning and Utilizing Agrarian Land, currently being discussed by the Grand National Assembly, was described as a priority bill in the agreement signed between the political forces represented in the Grand National Assembly. The exceptional importance of the issue imposed the conduct of a nationwide discussion in the mass media.

The necessity of adopting this bill was categorically expressed both in the election campaign of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and in the decisions of its 39th Congress.

The Bill on Owning and Utilizing Agrarian Land is incorporated within the foundation of the radical agrarian reform, which must be implemented in agriculture to guarantee:

—quickly leading the country out of the grave situation that it finds itself at present;

—creating reliable judicial and economic preconditions and guarantees of attracting more people to agriculture;

—overcoming the supply crisis and increasing the country's foreign currency resources;

—creating the necessary lasting prerequisites of restoring and developing the Bulgarian villages.

The Presidium of the BSP Supreme Council supports as a whole the bill proposed by the Permanent Commission on Agrarian Policy and Reform in Agriculture.

The BSP supports the creation of material-technical and economic prerequisites for applying for all forms of property—private, cooperative, state, and municipal. Those forms of property must be equal before the law, function under the same conditions, and enjoy the legal protection of the state. The most vital form of property must assert itself on the basis of market conditions and competition. The agrarian producers must preserve the variety of forms of property and select their own organizational forms of production—private farms, cooperatives, associations, and so forth.

The interests of all society merge in a complex pattern in anything related to the ownership of land. This includes the interests of people who live in work in the villages, and the former owners and their heirs. The BSP supports an agrarian reform that would greatly reflect all those interests and direct them in one direction without creating a confrontation among them.

The following must be the basic principle in managing the land: Land must belong to those who wish to cultivate and utilize it efficiently, while noting the interests of the former owners and their heirs.

We see resolving the issue of land ownership as a continuous process, rather than a single act, which would suddenly affect the interests of many people and complicate the problem of land ownership.

It is our position that the following principles must be incorporated within this law:

1. Restoring the ownership right of the owners and their heirs on land transferred to the Cooperative Labor Agrarian Farms (TKZS) for general use.

2. Guaranteeing the right of each citizen, who wishes to work in agriculture or acquire agrarian land, to have the possibility to do so.

3. Creating legal and economic guarantees for all forms of owning agrarian land.

4. Utilizing agrarian land for producing agrarian products only.

5. Preventing any form of acquiring agrarian land by foreign states, foreign judicial and physical entities and persons, and mixed companies with foreign participation. Those measures are the legal guarantee of checking various desires of representative of foreign capital to plunder our land, and preserving the land as the universal asset of the Bulgarian people.

6. Restricting deals with agrarian land for a fixed transitional period. During that period the purchase, sale, and leasing of land should be done only through the state. Agrarians, who because of various reasons cannot cultivate their land during the aforementioned period of time, can sell their land to the state. Thus a state fund of agrarian land will be formed. It will serve peasants without any property, or with little property, who would like to cultivate land.

7. Guaranteeing the right of independently and freely choosing the form of managing land owned by the agrarians.

The BSP decisively rejects any attempt to undermine or negate the role of the TKZS, and their members' role and contribution to constructing the Bulgarian economy. Such a position is not only unjust, but also historically incorrect.

Regardless of the serious weaknesses and distortions in creating the TKZS and the crude interference and exploitation on the part of the totalitarian state, the TKZS proved the advantage of large-scale mechanized agriculture and successfully resolved many social problems in the Bulgarian villages.

We, therefore, support the utilization of agricultural and other cooperatives of the managers-owners, which are closely connected with the land and the means of production, as well as the total application of democratic principles in forming such cooperatives and in their subsequent functioning. Undoubtedly, the TKZS, as cooperatives, will undergo a significant development. They presently have equipment, buildings, and basic funds, created with the labor of the cooperative members. Privatization could also be conducted in this sphere. Both those who have contributed their land to the TKZS or work in the TKZS, as well as people who have not contributed land, could receive their share of the funds.

Private farms could be formed simultaneously with developing and perfecting the cooperatives. We consider it historically unfounded and economically counterproductive, however, to totally dissolve the TKZS and return to small-scale and scattered agriculture. This will create unforeseeable confusion in agriculture and strengthen the agrarian and production crisis.

Regardless of the difficulties and complexity of the problems that emerge, we firmly adhere to placing agriculture upon market economy principles and strengthening the interest of the agrarians to increase agrarian production on this basis.

We think that the role of the state in the forthcoming changes in the control of property and the utilization of agrarian land is a fundamental issue, on which the efficiency of the agrarian reform depends.

Both world and our own experience show that agriculture mostly needs the care and assistance of the state, expressed in:

—the technological reequipment and resource supply of agriculture;

—developing a system of economic regulating instruments (taxes, interest rates, insurance), in an attempt to stimulate the efficiency of agriculture, and forming and optimal structure of utilizing the land;

—creating a mechanism against the unfounded parcellation of the land;

—protecting and developing branch cattle breeding, supplying seed and planting material, and developing veterinary-medical and plant-protecting services;

—ensuring the necessary normative, technical, technological, and other conditions of developing ecologically coordinated agriculture;

—asserting the rights of the state as the major purchaser of agrarian land;

—adopting special measures for resolving the acute social problems of the Bulgarian villages and enhancing the prestige of agricultural work.

During the transitional period we must by all means prevent the social vulnerability of the agricultural managers who cannot quickly adapt to the new conditions, older, disabled, and ill people, and minors. Society must provide appropriate guarantees of their social security. We must pay special attention to the fate of specialists engaged in the branch. The care for them is an important condition for successfully implementing the reform.

The implementation in life of the BSP political position on the reform of owning and utilizing agrarian land requires the energetic engagement of the entire party potential and all its supporters and sympathizers.

Today we appeal to all political forces to display prudence and a gradual approach in resolving the country's agrarian problem, to defend the interests of all, and to everyone a chance.

Foreign Minister Comments on Political Scene

AU2201125191 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 15 Jan 91 p 1

[Interview with Viktor Vulkov, minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union Permanent Board, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given]

[Text] [ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME] What kind of circumstances made the participation of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union Permament Board [BZNS] in the government necessary?

[Vulkov] The new cabinet, which already enjoys the wholehearted support of the parliament and of the public, represents the practical implementation of the BZNS' original proposal about electing a widely representative government. We submitted this proposal in the early stage of the National Roundtable sessions. Personally, I do not attach too much importance to the copyright on this idea, but rather to the political commitment we assumed toward the united agrarians and the people, and to the final result—namely to the establishment of a government with the participation of the major political forces. I think that this participation makes the government not only widely representative, but also competent, considering it includes individuals endowed with the necessary professional qualifications.

Although the government was composed at the last minute it shows the maturing of the political forces and their ability to take decisive steps to rescue the country from the deadlock of the crisis with common efforts. With its participation in the government, the BZNS confirmed its return to the most noble traditions of the Agrarian Union, which has never been a supporter of wait and see attitudes and of shunning responsibility in times of crucial historical events. At the same time I would like to point out that neither myself nor Boris Spirov volunteered to join the government team. We did this in compliance with a decision of the BZNS Supreme Union Council and the Administrative Council adopted in 1990 and in accordance with the BZNS Statute adopted at the 36th Congress.

The BZNS is worthily represented in the country's new government—its members have been appointed to the posts of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, combined with the position of foreign affairs minister, and to the post of minister of agriculture and food industry. I would like to recall our recent history. In 1945 Nikola Petkov, during a conversation with Vulko Chervenkov, declared that he does not consider the BZNS a ruling party, considering that it did not retain even one of the three key ministries—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or the Ministry of

Internal Affairs and Public Health. I think that 45 years later this argument is absolutely valid and I categorically support it. I am aware of my great responsibility as chief of the foreign affairs department, having assumed the task of promoting Bulgaria's new image in the eyes of Europe and the world. As to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, it is unnecessary to explain its importance under the conditions of the food shortage crisis and the urgent requirement to implement a radical agricultural reform in our country.

[ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME] Do you intend to give up the BZNS leadership?

[Vulkov] My participation in the government was motivated by the aforementioned arguments. This decision, however, was also my own and I am ready to assume all responsibility for it before the united agrarians and the National Assembly. In taking over the difficult task of becoming a cabinet member in this particularly grave situation affecting our homeland, I do not delude myself that this will be an easy and unproblematic job. Nevertheless, irrespective of the difficulties, I am also chairman of the BZNS in this crucial moment for our agrarian movement, and I am resolved to devote all my efforts to our worthy performance in the forthcoming elections! I am particularly involved in planning the future of the agrarian union—as an united, independent, and prestigious organization! This is where I see my tasks and responsibilities in the near future.

Last, but not least, I would like to declare my confidence in the loyalty of the united agrarians and the conviction that our followers, whose number amounts to several hundred thousands, will support the BZNS policy and my own work to the benefit of Bulgaria and for the sake of the agrarian movement's lofty ideas!

Prime Minister Meets Interim Council Leaders

AU2101154391 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 15 Jan 91 p 1

[Text] On 14 January 1991 Dimitur Popov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, held a meeting with the chairmen of the provisional oblast executive committees. Members of the Consultative Group on Determining the Memberships of Provisional Executive Committees also took part in the meeting. The meeting discussed the condition and the work of the provisional executive committees and the appointment of township administrations. It was reported that on 11 January provisional township administrations had been appointed in 3,661 of the 4,000 townships in the country. Problems exist in certain municipalities in connection with the functioning of the provisional leaderships. No provisional executive committee has yet been appointed for Varna Oblast.

Dimitur Popov set the municipal executive committees the task of appointing the remaining township administrations by 25 January, with the assistance of the political forces. It was announced that the prime minister, his deputies, and other members of the government will make visits to certain regions of the country to assist the activities of the new local government organs.

The government is undertaking major specific steps to put a stop to the inactivity of certain local services in individual towns and villages in the country.

The prime minister informed the participants in the meeting on the bills that are being prepared in the Council of Ministers and the measures for accelerating the economic reform.

The chairmen of the provisional oblast executive committees were invited to stimulate production in their oblasts in order to meet the population's needs in respect of food and basic goods, and to take decisive action against cases of speculation.

This meeting marks the restoration of the regular meetings of the leadership of the Council of Ministers and the prime minister with the chairmen and leaderships of the oblasts.

New BCP Leader Wants Former Leaders Tried

AU2101130791 Sofia BTA in English 1146 GMT 21 Jan 91

["New BCP Against BSP and Former Communist Leaders"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 21 (BTA)—Absolutely all former leaders of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] should be tried and held responsible for plundering the people and for other crimes, said Mr. Spasov, leader of the BCP, adding that unfortunately now the former party nomenklatura is impeding the trial against Todor Zhivkov.

Today "DEMOKRATSIYA" publishes an interview with Vladimir Spasov, leader of the revived Bulgarian Communist Party, who calls himself first secretary of the CC [Central Committee] in line with the traditions of the communist parties. He asserts that his party includes 900,000 Communists. The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], which is the successor of the BCP, asserts that its members range between 450 and 500 thousand. According to the present BCP, however, the BSP has no right to inherit the BCP.

Mr. Spasov explains that in April, 1990 187 people made all that was necessary for restoring the BCP and that their intentions were to "break with the feudal-fascist gang of Todor Zhivkov's leadership". But under the pressure of the ruling top their plan failed. The party first registered itself under the name "Party of the Working People" and later adopted the name Bulgarian Communist Party. At the elections it supported the BSP because it did not expect the Socialists to make a complete break from the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

According to Mr. Vladimir Spasov the renaming of the former BCP into BSP was a maneuver of Zhivkov's

nomenklatura aimed at deceiving the people "in order to completely devastate Bulgaria in a Zhivkovist manner".

Mr. Spasov rejects the notion of democratic socialism used by the BSP and declares himself against the privileges enjoyed by the active fighters against fascism and capitalism. The leader of the Communists also said that his party intended to participate in the forthcoming elections with a red ballot paper because it believed that the BSP had no right to use this color.

Lilov Meets BSP Members, Supporters in Kula

AU2201115991 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Jan 91 p 2

[Ninko Gruev report: "Aleksandur Lilov's Meeting With Socialists and Supporters"]

[Text] Kula, 14 January—Despite its crisis, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is undergoing a process of renewal. The important thing is that the correct approach has been found, namely, the peaceful transition from totalitarian to democratic society. This is what BSP Supreme Council Chairman Aleksandur Lilov said at his meeting today with BSP members and supporters in the border city of Kula.

He pointed out that the party had utilized its historic chance and initiated its own renewal. This process will continue for a long time. The fact that the BSP is expected to have 500,000 members after the exchange of the membership cards shows that it is an important political force that the people believe and support.

The difficulties that lie ahead really are great, but we must meet them with responsibility and readiness, because there is no other way. It is very important to justly distribute the social burden. In this sense we support the new government of Dimitur Popov in his difficult and responsible task. The BSP accepts the responsibility but not the guilt for the crisis and the grave situation, Lilov says.

A discussion developed after his speech.

Aleksandur Lilov met his constituency—the 70th Belogradchik Constituency in the villages of Ruzhintsi and Chuprene. He acquainted himself with the people's opinions and proposals.

Zhivkov Appeals For International Legal Help

AU2001192291 Sofia BTA in English 1814 GMT 20 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 20 (BTA)—Todor Zhivkov said the cabinet of former Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov was the most inert since World War II. The former Number 1, who was expelled from the Bulgarian Communist Party before it changed its name to Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], asked the BSP leadership why the organs of the Ministry of Interior had been disbanded and why betrayal of national interests was tolerated.

In his letter to the BTA, dated January 18, the former party and state leader, who was removed from power on November 10, 1989, says that over the past decades he has been an integral part of the life of the nation and that through his work he has felt inextricably bound up several generations of Bulgarians.

Todor Zhivkov's letter follows a visit to the Chief Prosecutor by BSP leaders concerning Zhivkov's case. Todor Zhivkov qualifies this as an act of political cynicism and amorality. He goes on to say that he considers the judicial inquiry a "put-up job" which has forced him to appeal to international institutions and organizations for legal help.

Fewer Sofia Residents Renew Party Membership

AU1901185891 Sofia BTA in English 1421 GMT 19 Jan 91

["BSP Popularity in Sofia Has Plunged"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 19 (BTA)—The citizens of Sofia are not eager to re-register in the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), DEMOKRATSIYA wrote today. Only 3,800 people have re-registered in one of Sofia's municipalities in which there were 11,000 members of the BSP last year. In another municipality with a population of 120,000 people, the number of BSP members dropped to 3,500 from 8,000 people last June.

The re-registration of the BSP members started in the autumn of 1990 and should have ended by the end of the year. However, this deadline has been protracted several times. There are no restrictions now for BSP membership, while under the former regime it was considered a kind of privilege. However, the BSP (former BCP) [Bulgarian Communist Party] membership has decreased by half. The total number of BSP members is about half a million and the party is still the largest in Bulgaria.

Threefold Rise in Interest Rate Expected

AU1801150391 Sofia BTA in English 1337 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 18 (BTA)—The basic interest rate in Bulgaria is to increase more than 3-fold and reach 15 per cent. At least for the time being, because the idea of the government and of the management of the Bulgarian National Bank is for the interest rate to become "floating" and to be formed on a market basis according to capital supply and demand.

This was a difficult decision of the government, according to Mr. Ivan Kostov, minister of finance. He described this rise as a means of balancing the interests of all participants in economic life.

The interest rate on deposits and credits of citizens and companies and their concrete size will be negotiated on a market basis.

Special attention is being paid to the so-called housing loans. In order to facilitate those citizens who owe a total of 6 billion leva to the state, mainly in the form of housing loans, the interest rate on these long-term loans will amount to two-thirds of the basic interest rate. Special concessions have been envisaged for pensioners who have not paid off their housing loans.

Many enterprises and state companies also have serious problems. They have accumulated a total debt of some 20 milliard [billion] leva to the state as a result of the hitherto prevailing absurd economic mechanism. But according to the president of the Bulgarian National Bank, Prof. Todor Vulchev, they will be able to negotiate a deferment of the payments.

Minister Kostov called the parliament to pass the bill on the interest rate change—a key element of the economic reform programme. Answering a question of the BTA, he expressed the hope that the so-called letter of intentions which representatives of the government are preparing in cooperation with experts of the International Monetary Fund in order as a basis for concluding an agreement between Bulgaria and the IMF, will be ready by the end of the month.

Price Reform, Attacks Against DUMA Viewed

AU1901192391 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 11 Jan 91 p 8

[Stefan Prodev untitled article]

[Text] The opposition press represented by DEMOKRATSIYA, SVOBODEN NAROD, and TRUD (this is no mistake), attacked DUMA with ridiculous zeal, regarding the information about the prices DUMA published. The three newspapers, and not only they, if we recall Bulgarian television and national radio, tried to prove that DUMA undermines the confidence in the government and provokes civil unrest. It appears that the gentlemen, members of the opposition, are concerned about the government and social peace, and forget what they wrote only a month or two ago against another government, which proposed lower prices and better social guarantees. I regret that I have to say those words, which do not refer to Mr. Popov, but to those journalists, who can quickly twist values and the truth.

I know that tomorrow those gentlemen will answer me with a salvo of incredible headlines and epithets, because I, Stefan Prodev, and no other, am the chief editor of DUMA. This will not change, however, the things related to the so-called "new prices."

Why do we pretend to be stupid, dear colleagues? Why do we try to talk in the old totalitarian manner with the people? Why not tell the people the truth;afterall, you pretend to be the heralds of the new society. The truth is clear and nobody can hide it. It does not depend on Popov, Kostov, Pushkarov, or Prodev. The truth is cruel. Nevertheless, it must be said openly, without fear and political speculations.

The prices that await us will not gratify us. They will alarm the millions of people who still believe in social justice. It is difficult to swallow this, but one must point out that social justice will suffer because of the new prices, which are the first step toward market economy. It does not matter whether we are red or blue. We shall continue to buy bread together, and thus suffer together. I do not accuse anyone. On the contrary, I root for the new government, and personally, for the prime minister. This is a gesture, a sign of understanding, a willingness to help, rather than a salvation. We all must understand that we will face difficult days, and no one should be angry and maintain that nobody told the truth.

DUMA readers were informed yesterday about the conversation between the prime minister and myself. No one was accused during the talk; we merely sought the truth. I do not know why the opposition press and the television and radio stations that are close to it, albeit they try to convince us that they have no party bias, attacked DUMA so fiercely; just because DUMA tried to tell the people that we face very difficult problems. DUMA did not seek any sensationalism, political goals, or a social provocation. Our newspaper merely wanted to inform the nation that it will not be easy, and that troubles lie ahead. Nothing else.

Did not those who tried to attack us know that in 10-15 days they will have to publish the new prices? What will happen if those prices turn to be close to the ones published by DUMA? What will they tell their readers then? I already know it and I will tell you what. Those who today curse and attack DUMA will tell the people that only the Socialists are responsible for the new prices. They and nobody else.

Dear readers, this will be a political rather than an economic argument. Please, do not believe this argument when you read it. DUMA tried to prepare you for the difficult time and not to undermine anybody. It merely wants its reader to not await any miracles or seek solace in intelligent but empty tales. The rest is your business. I do not want you to believe DUMA. Believe those who do not like us. Remember us, however, when the new prices are published. I do not want anything else. Perhaps then you will understand what DUMA meant.

Commentary Queries CSFR Gulf War Involvement

AU2201161091 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 21 Jan 91 p 3

[Jan Fuele commentary: "Looking After Our Own Interests"]

[Text] At the end of his visit to Czechoslovakia, President George Bush held a news conference. One of the issues discussed was the possible threat facing the new democracies in Europe. In the event that they are threatened, do they even have a chance of military support from the United States? Czech journalists added the following exclamation to their question: After all, we have no oil!

This was at a time when our antichemical warfare unit was preparing at Slany for its much proclaimed humanitarian mission. No one had even the faintest idea that it would be deployed only a few kilometers from the Kuwaiti border. The announcement in the Federal Assembly and the difficult decision made by those who went there would have been different; the reaction of our citizens would have been different. The world and Europe—to which we are so inexorably and stubbornly returning, although we are already in it—gazes upon us with the indulgent smile of someone older and wiser.

It is as if much of what we are doing—with attentive eyes fixed on our backs—is not being done for ourselves, but for those who are watching us. If we decide in favor of conversion, the watchers will praise us and—at the same time—will release their goods onto our freed market. Then, with the aid of equally ready hands, they will applaud and furnish us with their rich experience in dealing with unemployment.

Because they prepared this little gift for us, we will decide to quickly withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Deputies spend the entire day "thrashing out" this obvious diplomatic defeat making their justified indignation clear and giving an impartial or well-informed observer the impression that by doing so they are merely letting off steam before dealing with the real problems that niggle at this state and will continue to niggle at it. Then—so the impression gained from these rhetorical exercises is not lost all at once—we only find out fragmentarily about the Polish side's lack of support for our proposal and about the Hungarian "no" from foreign radio broadcasts. These are the facts. Justified indignation about Moscow's policy toward the Baltic states cannot be the only argument on the international scene. This argument, as opposed to our's, is a real political one. What about Europe's attentive eyes? They are satisfied since they know from the Civic Forum republican assembly that NATO—and NATO alone—provides the only guarantee of safety on the old continent....

We were told by Ladislav Kosta last week that we are not in a state of war, but in a state of so-called specific military conflict. The Czech Republic Health Ministry press spokesman tried to convince us from the television screen that this time we are fighting on the right side. Fine. We are fighting on the side of the U.S. Army's allies. Furthermore, of course, we are fighting for the liberation of Kuwait. Are U.S. soldiers also fighting for the same thing? James Baker, according to an article published in NEWSWEEK No. 48/90, did not speak about moral principles or about a friendly nation's freedom. He was extremely precise, for a diplomat: "In short, we are fighting for working opportunities." The same weekly quoted Lord Palmerston, Great Britain's foreign secretary in 1848: "We do not have eternal allies and we do not have constant enemies. Only our interests are eternal."

And ours?

Israeli Envoy Outlines Gulf War Issues

LD2201223291 Prague CTK in English 2051 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Bratislava Jan 22 (CTK)—Israeli Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Yo'el Sher told journalists here today he did not think that Syria would leave the anti-Iraqi coalition in the Gulf war since it is interested in forestalling the potential military threat from Iraq.

The ambassador repeated the stand of his country which is striving for the conflict not to be expanded, but added that it reserves the right to react differently if the need arises. He pointed out that Israel has adequate means to destroy the Iraqi potential in western Iraq.

According to Sher, the Gulf war should not only restore Kuwait's freedom and sovereignty, but also destroy the Iraqi military arsenal which poses a threat to the whole region.

The ambassador rejected linkage of the Gulf war to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He reacted to Saddam Husayn's effort to transform confrontation between Iraq and the anti-Iraqi coalition into a conflict between the Arab world and Israel. According to Sher, peace in the Middle East can be reached only at a direct dialogue between Israel and its neighbours.

Yo'el Sher appreciated his first visit to Slovakia as an opportunity for restoration of mutual contacts which were twice tragically severed in the past (over the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and were restored last year).

He praised the statement by the Slovak government and the Slovak National Council (parliament) of last December 20 admitting Slovakia's responsibility for the persecution of Slovak Jews in World War II. (Thousands of Jews were deported from Slovakia during the existence of the pro-Nazi Slovak state).

Soviet Withdrawal Through Country Discussed

LD2201121491 Prague CTK in English 1911 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 22 (CTK)—A leading official of the Czechoslovak Transport Ministry today confirmed to CTK the information carried by farmers' daily

"ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY" today that the possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany via Czechoslovakia is being discussed.

The withdrawal was discussed yesterday and today by representatives of Czechoslovak Railways, the German Reichsbahn Railway Company and the German Transport Ministry. According to ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, crossing the territory of Czechoslovakia to the USSR would be 100,000 soldiers, 50,000 civilians and unspecified amounts of military hardware.

Karel Sellner, director of the Czechoslovak Transport Ministry's Railway Department, said that the primary condition for realizing this exacting project is consent from the Czechoslovak Government, or the federal Foreign Ministry.

Only then—in March or April—would it be possible to start specifying economic and operational conditions. From the technical point of view, the withdrawal could start only in the second half of this year when the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia will have been completed (it is to be finished by June 30), Sellner said.

According to ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, the project would earn Czechoslovakia 1,000 million Swiss francs.

Commission Opposed

LD2201222491 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] The mixed legislative commission for overseeing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory adopted a resolution in which, regarding the international situation and public opinion, it has not recommended the transit of Soviet troops from Germany through Czechoslovak territory.

Michel Kocab, the chairman of the commission, said on the topic:

[Begin Kocab recording] There are also other ways to withdraw the Soviet Army from German territory. They can go through Poland. The USSR has had intensive talks about this with Poland. We would not like to worsen Poland's negotiating position with our hasty consent to transit through our territory as Poland is connecting this transit with the departure of Soviet troops from its territory. There is also the option of going over the Baltic Sea. So there are a number of possibilities. One must say in this connection that the speed of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia has been decided upon largely by taking into consideration how much our railroads can take without congestion. This means that if we transported a further four to six trains from Germany, it might mean a complication which could ensue in slowing down the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSFR. We would not like to allow this to happen in view of the unpredictable policy of the current Kremlin. [end recording]

Klaus on Demise of CEMA, Future Cooperation

AU2201151591 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 16 Jan 91 p 3

[Vaclav Klaus article: "CEMA: Born 1949, Deceased 1991"]

[Text] Exactly one year has elapsed since the news conference was held in Warsaw where I stated an obvious fact: CEMA is an inoperative and dead organization that preserves obsolete structures and an obsolete form of economic relations between individual member countries: It has never had a positive economic role and should be abolished. This elementary truth, quite often discussed among the economists of member countries (not to speak about internal observers), was voiced publicly for the first time by a member of the government of a CEMA country. This is why this truth exploded like a time bomb and unintentionally influenced the overall atmosphere at CEMA's 45th session in Sofia on 9 and 10 January 1990.

Exactly one year has elapsed since then. During this year I sometimes doubted whether what we did was enough. At this specific moment, it is clear that no news agency would file a similar statement, because it seems that the end of the CEMA existence has been decided. We must say in no uncertain terms that, fortunately, no real change will take place, because CEMA had ceased to exist a long time ago anyway. In 1990, the old principles of mutual cooperation among member countries completely disintegrated and, even if a number of negotiations were held, no one came up with the idea that during these negotiations CEMA should have a role of a coordinator or an independent arbiter—simply put, no one even mentioned its existence. When one CEMA member cut contractual deliveries, for instance crude oil from the USSR, no CEMA country took steps. When one CEMA country (German Democratic Republic) disappeared from the scene, no CEMA country discussed the obligations it had toward other countries. In the second half of January 1990, I chaired the 50th session of the CEMA Permanent Commission in Prague on the conversion rates and financial issues. We were unable to do anything more than to agree that the system of conversion rates had ceased functioning and that is was not possible for the governments to quickly correct these rates (which was completely unrealistic due to different price developments—as the large differences between the official and the black market conversion rates have also shown), that it was impossible to agree upon common principles for using the transferable ruble for the calculation of payment balances, that the conversion rate between the transferable ruble and convertible currencies was completely unrealistic, etc. The only conclusion was that it was necessary to move to market relations between CEMA countries and, most important, to move—on the basis of bilateral agreements (that is, without any intervention from CEMA)—toward payments in freely convertible currencies .

At the meeting of all member countries in Moscow last week, there was a proposal that CEMA be abolished at the 134th session of its Executive Committee and be replaced by a new, less ambitious organization of a consultative and coordinating type. I have strong doubts, however, about this new organization. What will this new organization do and how? A vast majority of member states are making efforts to dismantle their centrally planned system and to introduce market economy and privatization, to weaken the function of the state, to introduce price liberalization, to move toward world prices, and to fully integrate in the world economy. Will the search for a specific form of cooperation between Eastern European countries contribute to our integration in the world economy or will it curb this process? Will it be easier for us to enter Europe alone or in a group of countries whose problems are similar on the one hand and dissimilar on the other? Will we be able to retain our foreign trade relations, which we need so much, with these countries because, thanks to economic reform, our enterprises will be able to offer something to their partners or because there will be a permanent session of government officials in Moscow who will "coordinate" and provide "consultations"? Is it important for us to be members of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Community, a renewed CEMA, the Pentagonal, or similar institutions? Will we get more crude oil from the USSR because of a new CEMA? Will we sell more of our products to Poland because of a new CEMA? Will the USSR introduce the internal convertibility of the ruble because of a new CEMA? We could ask innumerable questions of this kind and it would be difficult to find answers.

We will have to think about them before we make a decision. One thing, however, is sure: We must not hide the old and compromised organization under a new name. If we did, we would not be making any progress.

Klaus' Slovakia Expansion Plans 'Outlandish'

AU2201105591 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 14 Jan 91 p 3

[Igor Cibula commentary: "Pithart Is More Circumspect Than Klaus"]

[Text] On the opening day of the Civic Forum [OF] republican assembly, LIDOVE NOVINY published an interview with Fedor Gal, chairman of the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement, on his views about recent developments in the Civic Forum. The VPN's most senior representative emphasized that "it is extremely necessary for OF to remain the same partner that we formed a coalition with following the parliamentary elections." He openly formulated the point of view that "the VPN can in no way influence OF's internal metamorphosis; however, we would be pleased if it did not forget that we have a joint responsibility for the implementation of economic reform and for society's stability."

In the context of the statement quoted above, Prime Minister Petr Pithart's assertion—made to journalists during the assembly—that "the VPN plays a significant role in Czech politics" does not seem at all exaggerated. Pithart's emphasis in his statement that the VPN's influence has been positively manifested to the benefit of those who strived to ensure that the OF oriented itself toward shaping a political party encompassing a broad ideological spectrum is no less interesting. This may also be taken to mean that the VPN representatives' sympathy did not lie with Vaclav Klaus. He presented the idea of transforming the OF into a right-wing political party.

If we embrace such an interpretation of the situation, then it is possible to reject the critical argument that in the coalition partnership with the OF, the VPN is always the partner that draws the shorter straw. Without overestimating the VPN's influence on the situation within the OF, it is possible to say that the supporters of Klaus' right-wing line cannot ignore the fact that if they were to thoroughly assert their crystallized concept, they would then cause problems in the coalition alliance with the centrist-oriented VPN movement. The situation on the Slovak political scene would force VPN officials to uncompromisingly implement their own program—regardless of the recurring risk of collision with the OF.

Perhaps Vaclav Klaus came up with the idea of expanding his right-wing party's membership base to include supporters from Slovakia on account of the OF's dependence on symbiosis with the VPN. It seems to some observers that this plan originated on the same drawing board as the plan to divide Slovakia into two union countries. This indicates, to say the least, a profound ignorance of the political situation in Slovakia where the right wing is represented by the Christian Democrats with their widespread support and certainly not by the negligible supporters of the Slovak National Party. Klaus' party political doctrine would have no real chance of winning over a significant percentage of Slovak voters; therefore, the aforementioned idea is too outlandish to be the subject of a serious political analysis.

Klaus Responds to Critics

AU2201101591

[Editorial Report] VIKEND [Weekend], the weekend supplement of Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech, publishes on 12 January on page 1 a 2,800-word interview with CSFR Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus by Jiri Leschtina. The date of the interview, which was conducted in Klaus' ministerial office, is not given.

In his opening reply, Klaus evaluates last year's economic results. He says that he regards the three-percent economic decline as "no tragedy" because it is accounted for, among other factors, by the "abolition of some inefficient production programs, including military programs." He points out that the volume of Czechoslovakia's foreign debt "remained virtually unchanged, the rate of inflation did not reach even 10 percent, and the number of vacant jobs

still exceeds the number of unemployed." Given the fact that Czechoslovakia's imports of crude oil were 20 percent lower than in 1989, one must evaluate the 1990 performance as "fair," Klaus says.

The minister goes on to respond to the view of "some politicians" that Czechoslovakia should "slow down the pace of reform" because the economic reform program had been drafted under different conditions—at a time when there was no shortage of oil, no crisis in the Gulf, and when "CEMA held together at least outwardly." While Klaus acknowledges the great impact of the aforementioned factors on economic life and the need to be prepared for "catastrophic situations," he believes that they should have no bearing on the reform: "The reform is a process of economic and political changes particularly in the institutional and organizational spheres and it must continue under any circumstances. Quite to the contrary, in the face of an external economic threat we must maximally speed up the entire reform process. Only in this way shall we provide enterprises with the tools they need to face up to problems for which they are not to blame."

In his subsequent reply, Klaus justifies price liberalization and the resultant "price shock." He says that in the conditions of a significant preponderance of demand over supply price increases cannot be avoided. He is convinced, however, that "prices will go up only until they run up against the consumers' refusal to accept them, at which point the all-powerful producers will be forced to reduce prices." He expresses his confidence in the "rational behavior of people" and points out in this context that beef producers have already had to cut their prices because consumers were "ignoring" their products.

Speaking about price increases, Klaus also reacts to the fears of high inflation. He says that as long as the government implements its anti-inflationary policy, does not give in to wage demands, and does not start printing money, "we will succeed in halting the increase in prices and cut across the inflationary spiral." The minister estimates that the rate of inflation will increase "from fewer than 10 percent last year to around 30 percent."

Next, Klaus is asked to comment on a statement made by Roman Kovac, president of the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions, in a MLADA FRONTA DNES interview that the Federal Ministry of Finance pushes through its "anti-social concept of economic reform in an unscrupulous way." Klaus qualifies Kovac's statement as "rather inaccurate" because the reform concept is not the concept of the Ministry of Finance but a concept which has been approved by the government and the legislature. He also rejects the charge of "antisocial policy," stressing that "all expenditures in the state budget for 1991 are being reduced, with a single exception—the area of social security."

While speaking about Klaus' attitude toward the trade unions, Leschtina also inquires about his recent promise of "state support" for the Zetor tractor factory, following Zetor workers' threat to go on strike. As Leschtina observes, the "left-wing press rejoiced" at this "concession." Klaus explains that the case of Zetor was a special one as its difficulties are caused by the trade embargo on Iraq. On the other hand, the finance ministry "refused to finance any frozen claims of the enterprise that are not connected with the current Iraqi crisis." Besides, the "state support" for Zetor will be limited to 250 million korunas, while the Zetor managers asked for 570 million. Klaus believes that "it is therefore wrong to speak about concessions of the government or Minister Klaus."

In his following question, Leschtina confronts Minister Klaus with the objections of the "right-wing critics" of his reform. He says: "The government's decision to retain the possibility to regulate the prices of about 15 percent of Czechoslovak products has aroused the wrath of sworn devotees of the market. Does this mean a concession by the more cautious politician Klaus to the radical economist Klaus?"

The minister replies that he does not think that he is "a particularly schizophrenic person" and that he tries to be consistent in what he does as a politician and an economist. He defends the regulation of prices by arguing that it should help combat inflation and that it concerns "only a very limited number of products." Moreover, the measure has been adopted only for a "period of transition." Asked how long this period of transition will be, Klaus says that he believes that it will be "very short."

The subsequent portion of the interview concerns the impact of the jurisdiction disputes between the federal and republic governments on the reform. Leschtina asks: "The view exists that the reform has been sacrificed to the law on division of powers and that, thanks to the powers which it has acquired, the Slovak government can simply reject the basic principles of the reform."

Klaus replies: "I see no reason why it should do so. There exist no fundamental differences between the federal, Czech, or Slovak governments in the overall philosophy of transition to the market, in my opinion. I am less optimistic, however, regarding the question to what degree the law on division of powers can complicate an efficient execution of the reform, which often requires that decisions be made fast. I am somewhat horrified at the idea that, in a situation where I am involved in complex six-hour negotiations with the IMF here in this office on the rate of exchange, which the IMF must approve, or in the preparation of wage regulation, I would have to constantly run to the telephone and ask the Czech or Slovak governments. This does not mean, of course, that I do not respect their opinion. The fact simply is that some decisions, particularly on questions of finance, must be made immediately and at one place. I am afraid that the version of the law on division of powers that has been approved is a bit too vague with respect to this problem in some of its parts and permits the emergence of some complications."

In his concluding statement, Klaus expresses his creed that "our successes or defeats will be decided mainly in the economic field" and that Czechoslovak society's hope resides in the "activity of capable individuals, in their wisdom, work, and entrepreneurial spirit."

Cabinet Approves Law on State of Emergency

LD2101234491 Prague CTK in English 2252 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 21 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Federal Government approved a bill establishing measures to be taken in a state of emergency at a special session here today.

The new bill provides for extraordinary provisions to be applied either throughout the entire country or in just one region, and includes the possibility of limiting freedom of movement, freedom of residence and freedom of assembly, as well as halting the activities of civic associations and limiting the right to strike. The state does not have any means to react to an extraordinary situation at the moment.

According to the bill, a state of emergency may only be declared by the Czechoslovak president at the proposal of, or with the consent of, the federal government or with the consent of the governments of the Czech and Slovak Republics.

A state of emergency may only be declared in the case of war or in other cases of a state of defence alert, that is, a state of immediate, clear and forced impairment of the state's constitutional system, or a situation that threatens human life, health or important economic resources to an extraordinary extent.

The maximum period for such arrangements would be 90 days. The consent of the Federal Assembly (parliament) would have to be obtained to extend a state of emergency.

The president of the Republic is required to submit a justification for the state of emergency both to the federal minister of the interior and the interior ministers of the republics, and to introduce all arrangements necessary to assist the armed security forces in the defence of the constitutional system and other state entities.

The president would also be granted the power to order the Army to assist the armed security forces in their duties, and to order the armed forces to secure the country's supply, telecommunications, transportation and energy systems and medical services.

The federal Cabinet also approved a bill from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, providing for a special plane to be sent to Jordan and Syria to transport 140 current and former Czechoslovak citizens to Czechoslovakia. The government said it would cover the expenses in order to protect women and children who feel threatened by the war in the Gulf. The flight will leave for Damascus on January 22.

Rychetsky Comments

LD2201182991 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Excerpts] The Federal Assembly today received a draft constitutional bill on a state of emergency, with a request for its speedy discussion in the plenum of the legislature.

Replying to a question from a CTK correspondent, Deputy Federal Prime Minister Pavel Rychetsky said that since November 1989, many undemocratic institutions have been removed. Now we do not have, however, any institutions and legal amendments that would make it possible to take the necessary steps if the state should find itself in an extreme situation. Thus it is necessary, above all in connection with Saddam Husyan's statements and the situation in the Baltic area, to anchor in the Constitution possibilities of resolving the situation when the state is threatened. [passage omitted] The serious character of a situation caused by a declaration of a state of emergency and by the adoption of exceptional measures also envisages, for a certain period, restriction of some rights and freedoms of citizens.

As chairmen of chambers and individual parliamentary committees agreed today, the 13th plenary session of the Federal Assembly, which will start on 29 January, would be adjusted so that committees will be able to examine the draft constitutional bill on which the plenum will express its view.

Meciar Comments

LD2201213391 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Report on statements made by by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar at 22 January news conference in Bratislava]

[Excerpt] The Slovak government was in session in Bratislava today, Michal Tvarozek and Magda Pospislova report:

[Pospislova] Right at the beginning of today's session, the government of the Slovak Republic rejected the draft constitutional bill on the state of emergency which was discussed yesterday by the federal government. We asked Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar at the afternoon news conference to give the reasons for this step.

[Begin Meciar recording] The bill, as it was formulated by the federal government, was legally imprecise. It gave rise to broad and undefined interpretation. We did not adopt this bill because it did not respect the fact that the republics also have certain powers on these matters. It is said that the federal government made some changes to the bill yesterday, but even so we consider it to be

incorrect. It gives enormous power to the federal government that, through this wide interpretation, could be used in various ways. This is not a question of mistrust but a question of legal precision and also of legal political security. [end recording]

[Pospislova] The public at large will probably be most interested in the general agreement for 1991 which was approved today. As we reported last week, the greatest conflict between the three sides concerned the setting of the minimum wage. While the trade unions proposed a figure of 2,350 korunas [per month], the government and employers were insisting on a minimum gross monthly salary of 1,850 korunas. The result of several joint talks was the setting of a figure of 2,000 korunas. What this compromise will mean for the Slovak economy was briefly explained at the news conference by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

[Begin Meciar recording] We propose 1,800 korunas because the average wage here is about 150 to 200 korunas lower than in the Czech Republic. Regarding the single agreement for the whole territory of the federation, the minimum wage here will also be 2,000 korunas. The problem is not only that the enterprises will have to earn the money for this, and if they do not have it there will be dismissals; the problem lies in the fact that if the lower limit rises, and it will rise proportionately to price increases, we will get to a situation where we will be leveling out earnings. In other words, those who earn more will not experience an increase, as all the profit will be used for a rise in the lower limit. This is our own specific Slovak problem which will affect us somewhat more, but it ensues from the economic principles of reform. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Deputy Interior Minister on Nationwide Security

LD1801063591 Prague CTK in English 2219 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 17 (CTK)—Czechoslovak First Deputy Interior Minister Jan Ruml announced today that no extraordinary events have taken place in Czechoslovakia in connection with the start of military operations in the Persian Gulf and security in the country is unchanged.

Reporting on television to the population he said that the country "has to watch for possible sudden activation of e.g. [for example] forces of the former totalitarian regime or movements among foreign troops on our territory... We are threatened by the state terrorism of Soviet Armed forces which, under certain circumstances, can destabilize the situation in the former communist countries".

Ruml said that the crisis staff of the Interior Ministry which he is heading assesses systematically the situation in Czechoslovakia and in neighbouring states, especially Poland, the Soviet Union and Germany, paying attention mainly to the Soviet forces on their territories.

He announced that from tomorrow checks at border crossings, especially of trucks, will be stricter. Patrols guarding buildings and facilities have been reinforced.

Interior Ministry spokesman Martin Fendrych said earlier that no attacks nor any indications of such activities have been registered in Czechoslovakia. There were only threatening anonymous telephone calls of doubtful credibility but even so they were checked, he said.

Dlouhy: Soviet Oil Supplies 'Regular'

LD1801223791 Prague CTK in English 2002 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 18 (CTK)—The Persian Gulf and Lithuanian events have not influenced so far supplies of Soviet oil to Czechoslovakia which are for the time being regular, Czechoslovak Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy said in an interview for the mass media here today.

It was only yesterday that, most probably due to technical reasons, these supplies were reduced. It depends on Soviet developments. A possible destabilization in the future might cut them, Dlouhy said. "If this does not happen and if the situation in the Persian Gulf is not extraordinary for a long time, I think, this year's consumption might range between 11 to 13 million tonnes," he said and added in this context that since yesterday oil has been channeled by the Adria oil pipeline from Iran.

Dlouhy spoke about the price of oil which has been stable so far and, according to calculations of foreign experts, it should not increase enormously.

Economic measures in three variants have been worked out for possible emergency situations, Dlouhy said.

Czech Prime Minister Views 'Socialist Ownership'

LD2201221491 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1800 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Mr. Prime Minister, in your recent address you drew attention, in connection with guarding enterprises, to a slackening in an attitude toward what we could perhaps term national property. You indicated that it is connected to the relationship with the so-called socialist ownership. Could you expand on this aspect?

[Pithart] You have just used the expression national property. It is not a current term. You also talked about socialist ownership. This is a rejected term. I assume that we both know what we have in mind. But we have no real term for this notion which could be generally accepted. This is somewhat disturbing. Naturally, I do not think that our citizens will lose ties with property altogether. The way the car owner looks after his car, the house owner after his house, and so on—all this is evidence

that the attitude toward private ownership has been worked out more than sufficiently. What is involved, however, is that in the former regime, each individual built his private life as a closed world. And what was beyond its frontiers, that is outside, was of interest to anyone because he could have no say in it and because only unpleasant things came from there. The former regime supported this kind of of behavior. On the one hand, the so-called socialist ownership was elevated to something almost sacred. Offences against it, for example, were being punished much more strictly than offences against private ownership. In a way, it turned socialist ownership into some kind of an ideology. The former regime itself, however, did not take it seriously and the actual comrades had provided instructions for demoralization; they tolerated lazy work and waste in a big way and they concentrated more on their own luxuries. What had been ceremoniously declared as ownership by all the people suffered from general lassitude. When a blunder did show up by some chance, it was always possible to fix it somehow, but the consequences were borne by all of us. That is why we strive today for each thing to belong to someone, that someone is responsible for it. If an enterprise commits a blunder, there is no reason why the consequences should be borne by the entire society. It does not even have what it takes. It does not have to be a blunder caused directly. Did the terrorists blow up your factory? That is a pity, but it is mainly your problem. Why did you not guard it before it happened?

[Reporter] Do you think that a year after the revolution we are still incapable of feeling responsibility for what, true, does not belong to our private life, but has been entrusted to us in one way of another?

[Pithart] I do not think that we are very capable of it. I think that indifference prevails. If it does not prevail, then we approach the matter again in an ideological way, merely with an opposite mark. Often we worry who from the leadership of the enterprise was in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, but it does not occur to us to pay attention, for example, to whether the commissioners and guards are awake or asleep at night.

[Reporter] Today we often talk about the so-called natural restitution; that is, about returning property to its former owners. Do you think that this measure will contribute toward overcoming the standpoint about which we have just spoke?

[Pithart] Certainly, sometimes it will make a contribution. But the problem is whether or not this is generally valid. I am not sure about that. Why? There will be interest in returning property— assets such as houses, production lines, arable land, and other things—to the people who have no relation with it. They will only be concerned with hiring it out or selling it, as far as possible advantageously. But they may not be interested at all.

[Reporter] Would it be better to grant, instead of natural restitution—that is, returning property to the original owner—some kind of a financial compensation?

[Pithart] I am not saying that. I do not like simple solutions at all because, as a rule, they are unilateral. Financial compensation would mean starting the circulation of money which is not covered by anything else but the act of this late justice. In essence, it would have to lead toward increasing inflation. At the same time the compensation would only be a fraction of the original value of the property. It would only be a symbolic compensation.

[Reporter] If we want to have a legal state, can we afford to ignore justice?

[Pithart] No. We cannot afford to and we do not want to ignore justice. But justice is not a simple principle. Look at it this way: After the new year—that is, following the liberalization of prices—it has turned out that privatization, for the time being, has not started yet at all. Why? Because the appropriate measures have been delayed. They have been delayed by the question of restitution, if you want to hear it, the justice which the legislatures had to discuss so that justice gets its own due. The result is that the organizations not yet privatized, monopoly trade organizations, have increased their prices to the maximum and many people, above all pensioners, have to tighten their belts and are worried about making ends meet. Is this justice? We know a saying from the old Roman Empire: May the world die, but there must be justice.

[Reporter] Mr. Prime Minister, how do you think we should proceed?

[Pithart] The rules of procedure are not being set by the government, not even by the federal government, but by the legislature. And it must create them. The Czech government has issued, on the occasion of the day of human rights on 10 December, a statement which, unfortunately, did not attract much attention. It voices the principle that the damage caused by the historical epoch cannot be fully compensated. We can and we ought to try to do away with them, but we cannot compensate for them. Simply, one cannot create such a situation as if the historical epoch never existed. I will take the liberty of quoting one passage from the statement: Taking stock of the past must be all the more principled and more thorough the more we realize that, virtually, we are capable of correcting only a small part of the committed crimes and suffered wrongs, and that, in particular, the most difficult ones cannot be put right. That is why we must not succumb to the new form of old illusions about the cleansing power of violence and retribution and about advantages of one-stroke decisions. End of quote. In this connection, I would like to say something for the sake of precision. The statement talks about correcting and putting right crimes and wrongdoings.

Crimes and wrongdoings caused material damage, but much greater was the moral damage. It affected several generations. We admit frankly that we do not have what it takes to put right the majority of material damage. We can strive, however, to overcome the moral damage, for example, by trying to secure honorable living conditions for the victims of the crimes and wrongdongs, not material well-being, but honorable living conditions. And, that, of course, is only a part of what we could and should strive for.

[Reporter] As to the nature of financial restitutions?

[Pithart] On my behalf, I can only say that aside from past face-to-face justice, there is also current and future face-to-face justice, and the two should not contradict. I also want to say that an inseparable component of the second justice is certain care about economically surviving today and, tomorrow, begin getting richer both as individuals and as a society. [sentence as heard] That means that, I assume, the solution will not be clean. It will simply be a combination of both types of restitution, and it will be up to the legislature to decide which reforms will be both just and able to be implemented without slowing down the economic reform.

[Reporter] Mr. Prime Minister, I thank you for the interview.

Meciar on Future of Slovakia, Screening

AU2201120391 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 14 Jan 91 pp 1, 3

[Speech by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar; place and date not given]

[Text] Dear citizens: Last time I informed you about the stages of the economic reform. Allow me to inform you about the intentions of the Slovak government to build Slovakia as a modern and democratic state.

This year, Slovakia should have its own constitution for the first time. Groups of experts are working on this constitution and soon they will be able to present their draft for a public discussion. It will be our constitution and everyone will be allowed to express his opinion on it. Of course, the adoption of the republican constitution should also be the basis for the adoption of the federal constitution. Philosophical differences in the attitude toward the constitution still persist, and therefore it is foreseeable that—in the view of the multitude of principal opinions about and standpoints on the nature of our future state—a great deal of political prudence will be needed. There are two tendencies in Slovakia: a tendency toward a federation and a tendency toward a confederation. The latter is considered in some political circles. In Bohemia, there are tendencies either toward a strengthening of the existing federation or a federation established on the basis of an agreement with Slovakia. Such a distribution of forces justifies the suspicion that we are going to face complicated political negotiations.

In a government declaration we promised that we will modernize the entire state administration in Slovakia. We have promised that, within a year, we will reduce the number of ministries. We do not want to replace Pragocentrism by Bratislava centrism. This is why organizational provisions to reduce the number of ministry employees are being prepared. We are going to reduce the number of their employees, whether they want it or not.

In some places the administration grew faster than we wanted it to. Of course, we are going to prepare a vast decentralization because the existing structure of the state administration is not yet final. Regional National Committees were abolished and their jurisdiction was divided between the center and the districts. This was not our goal. When speaking about the state administration, we have to express our concern about the fact that many offices on the level of districts and regions have been established with the explicit structure of ministerial sectors. Such a structure has proven to be inefficient in our economy and does not represent the best solution to our state administration either. This is why we will have to return to this question again, and we will have to think how we are going to coordinate activities on the level of regional organs, how we are going to decentralize the state administration, and how we are going to create its democratic and modern form.

Another important matter for Slovakia is the final [administrative] division of the country. It is clear that the existing system of districts is unable to fulfill the tasks in the spheres of social planning, employment, environment, and many others. It is inevitable that larger territorial units will be created. Appropriate commissions have begun their work on this problem. There are about six drafts. Of course we will give everyone an opportunity to express their opinion on the subject. But, because in Slovakia everyone likes his valley and his village, a public discussion would not be a success. This means that we will have the opportunity to express our opinions on some important questions, but a final form will have to be decided by the government while various local interests will have to be ignored. The frequent tendency to return to the structure of the districts that existed before 1960 is not acceptable. It would be a large step backwards. We cannot walk this way.

The constitution and the state administration will become pillars of Slovakia's reconstruction. Of course, the matter is complicated by the fact that the state administration, as a tool of the government, is itself under reconstruction. Due to this fact the implementation of many of our provisions is more difficult. Yet, even this period can be overcome and solutions can be found.

Another problem that has unsettled the public is the question of screening. To screen or not to screen? Of course, the answer is unequivocal and many of us already know the answer. To some people it appears inexplicable why the Slovak National Council and Slovak government, too, hesitate about this matter. For

the third time in the course of seven months we are facing the problem of what standpoint to adopt toward screening. Let me explain our standpoint.

Screening is a tool of political struggle. It is not a clean tool and it brings forth only filth. The question is what was the scope of dangerous behavior. Not only State Security [StB] members and their collaborators were the pillars of the former regime. Today, when we are solving the problem of collaborators we are forgetting that those who controlled them have high positions in the new state administration and that there are also other pillars of the old regime who remain intact and face the future without fear. On the subject of screening I must say that since I have assumed my position in the government I have been pointing to problems that could arise. We were afraid that documents from archives could be misused for political goals by some groups. We were granted guarantees from the federal interior minister that documents that were located in Slovakia would not leave Slovakia and that these documents would be archived in Slovakia until the Slovak National Council and the Slovak Government request access to them. Unfortunately, all the documents were taken out of Slovakia and brought to Prague.

We would adopt a different attitude toward screening if certain extremist groups did not try to acquire political capital from it. For example, one speculation was that Meciar, knowing that some people were StB collaborators, used this fact to push these people to support his stance on the competence bill. If we took this allegation at face value, then we would have to admit that there are a few millions of State Security collaborators in Slovakia.

We would also adopt a different attitude to this problem if the principles of objectivity, impartiality, and reliability were met. We agreed to screening when we were running in the elections to representative bodies. The result was deplorable. People who have never been StB agents were singled out as agents. It happened that one of the leading representatives was singled out as an agent. When the matter was investigated further, it was discovered that it was a provocation. Screening is performed by the same people as before. What are the guarantees that a similar situation will not be repeated? What are the guarantees that the law on the obligation to keep classified material secret will be respected? The resolution of the Federal Assembly cannot contradict the Federal Assembly's laws.

Of course, neither the Slovak National Council nor the Slovak government wants former StB collaborators to work as their employees for a long time. Of course, the process of a gradual cleansing has already begun and continues. Yet this process requires time, must be organized and implemented by these bodies, and cannot be dictated from outside. This process cannot serve as a tool for driving a wedge between Czech and Slovak nations. We have already seen extreme examples of this.

Because of this, our standpoint is that the government will consent to screening under two conditions. First, all documents from archives will be returned to Slovakia in their original state. Second, an independent commission of experts will be formed who will guarantee impartiality—in all disputable cases, results will not be published and no steps will be taken until we make the entire matter absolutely clear and are sure that we do not harm anyone. It is better to keep two State Security collaborators in their posts than to harm, discredit, and lie about one innocent person.

Screening will be haunting us for a while. Screening may become a tool for spreading disinformation and making speculations. This is how we understand it and this also is our attitude. We can purge public life by political means. The Slovak National Council and, of course, the Slovak government will make efforts to achieve this.

Defense Ministry Views Warsaw Pact Withdrawal

AU2201133791 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 15 Jan 91 p 4

["(D.J.)" -signed interview with Defense Ministry Spokesman Colonel Gyorgy Keleti; place and date not given: "We Wish to Close Down the Warsaw Pact by Means of Negotiations"; first two paragraphs are MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] "As of 1 January, 1991, Hungary has no connection whatsoever with the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty, the former subordination and superordination relations have been eliminated." This statement was made by Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall on Saturday, 12 January, at a military memorial ceremony held in the Buda Castle in honor of the victims of the Don breakthrough.

We asked Gyorgy Keleti what this statement meant in practice.

[Keleti] Previously, in certain conflictual situations, the leadership of the united forces of the Warsaw Pact would have counted on the strength of the Hungarian People's Army—later on, the Hungarian Army—but on 1 January, this situation ceased to exist. The sole duty of the Hungarian Army is to defend the sovereignty of the Hungarian Republic. The Hungarian Army can no longer be forced to take part in the joint activities of the Warsaw Pact. Joint military exercises both in Hungary and on foreign soil have been stopped. In fact, we did not even carry out joint exercises with the Soviet Southern Army Group stationed in Hungary. The Warsaw Pact previously had directives on ways to develop the armies belonging to the member countries, including Hungary's Army, but today, not even these directives apply to us any longer. As far as we know, the defense ministerial council of the Warsaw Pact held its last meeting in 1990, and the mutual military council is not working either—or, in any case, we are not participating in either of these bodies.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Soviet soldiers used to represent the Warsaw Pact in Hungary, and Hungarian liaison officers used to work in Moscow.

[Keleti] At the general headquarters of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, the chief of staff used to have national deputies. One of these deputies was a Hungarian general. Approximately another 25 Hungarian soldiers worked for the Warsaw Pact. Currently, there are altogether one general and five officers serving their period in Moscow. Their duty is to wind up our relations. The Hungarian representative of the general headquarters and the staff of this representative used to work in Hungary, but their numbers are also diminishing now. Nevertheless, a few people are still operating here because the final political decision concerning the closure of the Warsaw Pact military organization has not been made yet. Rumor has it that this decision will be made soon. The political council of the Warsaw Pact has the authority to make such a decision. In accordance with the decision of the Hungarian National Assembly, we do not wish to break off our relations; we want to close them down by means of negotiations.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Could the leader of the Warsaw Pact still give orders to the Hungarian Army?

[Keleti] The Hungarian Defense Ministry is led by a minister who represents the viewpoint of his own government—namely, that we should leave the military organization of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, the leaders of the Hungarian Army have sworn an oath to protect the independence of this country.

Committee Discusses Soviet Site Appropriations

LD1501235291 Budapest MTI in English 1916 GMT 15 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 15 (MTI)—An inter-ministerial committee headed by government commissioner, Lieutenant General Antal Annus held a session on Tuesday, in which issues involving the appropriation of real estates left by withdrawing Soviet troops were discussed.

The session was also attended by representatives of the treasury's property handling agency and mayors of seven constituencies.

Antal Annus informed participants that local elections had created conditions for an accelerated appropriation of real estates left by the Soviets, owned by the state and handled by the Ministry of Defence.

The appropriation must be conducted with the help of local administrations, on good terms with government organizations, and adhering to legal regulations.

The committee compiled a proposal for the appropriation of real estates handed over by Soviet troops in Csakvar, Csaszar-Szak-Szend-Bokod, Szentendre, Dunafoldvar, Igal and Veszprem.

The inter-ministerial committee is to work out proposals for all areas in question by the end of May.

1990 Exports to Middle East Drop 40 Percent

LD2201140391 Budapest MTI in English 1004 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 22, 1991 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Last year, Hungarian exports to the Middle East, which totalled 270 million USD [U.S. dollars] in 1989, worked out at only 160 million USD, a 40 percent drop, mainly owing to the conflict in the Gulf.

Taken as a whole, Hungarian exports grew by 18 percent in 1990.

Exports to Iraq saw the largest drop because of the UN embargo: They plummeted from 26 million USD to 4 million, whilst those to Kuwait fell from 39 million USD to 18 million.

The fallback was also considerable in Hungarian exports to Saudi Arabia: The drop here was from 61 million to 28 million USD.

Hungarian exports to Lebanon dropped from 44 million to 25 million USD, and those to Syria from 27 million to 20 million USD.

Hungary's exports to the United Arab Emirates fell from 25 million USD to 15 million, and those to Jordan from 16 million to 10 million USD.

Israel was the only country in the region where Hungarian exports increased: The 23 million USD of 1989 became 27 million USD last year.

An official from the Hungarian Ministry of International Economic Relations told ECONEWS it is to be feared Hungarian exports will continue to fall back this year because of the Gulf war, and that contracts companies have concluded for 1991 barely reach half the 1990 amount at the moment.

Foreign Trade Minister Gives News Conference

LD1801164391 Budapest MTI in English 1514 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 18 (MTI)—"This year promises to be a tougher year than 1990 from the foreign economic point of view as well," Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations said, at his press conference in Budapest on Friday.

"According to projections, Hungary's trade with Eastern countries will drop by 20-25 per cent as compared with 1990, and the probable 4-6 per cent growth of exports to the West won't be enough to offset this. A repetition of last year's trade surplus of 1,000 million dollars is out of the question. The uncertain factors affecting our trade with East European countries, which continue to dog us despite the fact that we were the first to establish new-style relations with the Soviet Union and sign agreements with the federal government and the Russian Federation, will also have implications for our exports to the West. Smaller amounts of raw materials are to arrive from the East, spelling a decline in our country's exports of processed products.

"The situation is compounded by the fact that investment in Hungary been following a steady downward curve for the past 10 years, making it particularly difficult to launch an export offensive in this way," Kadar said. He said he hoped that the Hungarian economic policy geared to promoting the development of an external economy would be implemented in the first half of the year. As of January 1, basic state provision for export development was eliminated, in spite of the fact that in 1990 alone, new commodity stocks valued at some 400 million dollars were created with support from export development funds. The ministry is currently working on the new financing blueprint. According to their calculations, a growth in exports valued at an additional 500-600 million dollars a year could be attained by ensuring the appropriate resources.

Discussing Middle East relations, Kadar said the Hungarian turnover and cooperation with Israel, Egypt and Syria could increase, and Hungary expects to be able to participate in the rebuilding of Kuwait and Iraq following the war.

Government Finalizes Compensation Bill

LD1501213591 Budapest MTI in English 1910 GMT 14 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 14 (MTI)—The Hungarian Government held an extraordinary session on Monday.

Balazs Laszlo, government spokesman informed MTI that the proposal for a compensation bill was finalized at the session. The government made additional amendments to the bill. Parliament is to discuss the bill, which was first submitted last December, with these amendments in the following days.

The bill speaks about compensation for property damage suffered since 1949. The maximum amount of compensation is 5 million forints, to be distributed in the form of compensation coupons, that can be used for buying state property during the privatization process.

Skubiszewski on Gulf, Baltics, Troop Pullout

AU2201162191 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 17 Jan 91 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by Kazimierz Woycicki; place and date not given: "The Continuity of Polish Efforts in a Turbulent World"]

[Text] [Woycicki] To what extent could hostilities in the Gulf change world politics so they begin to impact on Poland's situation?

[Skubiszewski] The answer to that question would have to take into consideration all the different criteria involved, but I would just like to highlight one factor; namely, the relationship between the United States and the USSR. The two states are military superpowers. The USSR is no longer an economic superpower, but this is not relevant in this instance. If their attitudes in relation to the Kuwait conflict—if it develops into military hostilities—should diverge, it will have an influence on the global situation. In this happens it could have a significant effect on our own international relations. At the moment, the position of the two superpowers is very close. That is why I do not think that in the immediate future this conflict will have any implications for Poland's position in relation to other European and non-European states, although I must stress that this is the view I hold today of today.

[Woycicki] How could and how far should the Soviet intervention in Lithuania influence Polish-Soviet relations? Is Poland capable of a resolute reaction when our Western partners have their hands tied by the Gulf conflict?

[Skubiszewski] The influence is there, but is difficult to define. We are talking and negotiating with the Soviet Union on many issues. These matters are already sufficiently complicated so we should try to avoid additional complications. Concerning our reaction, this was quite clear and resolute. Please read the declarations made by the Polish Sejm, Senate, Foreign Ministry, and most recently, by the government. We summoned the Soviet charge d'affaires to the Foreign Ministry and our ambassador in Moscow for consultations in Warsaw. In diplomatic practice these are moves that carry certain weight. Other countries acted much more cautiously. Still others used strong language, but strong language will not help such things. I do not believe that the Western powers have their hands completely tied by the Gulf conflict. The reactions of these states to the events in Lithuania and in the other Baltic republics has been immediate. I had occasion to discuss this matter with Douglas Hurd in Great Britain.

[Woycicki] In light of the Soviet behavior in Lithuania, does not the issue of Soviet troops in Poland and their withdrawal assume special significance? Does the German side understand the problems linked with the transportation of Soviet troops from the former GDR through Poland and the simultaneous pullout of Soviet troops stationed in Poland?

[Skubiszewski] No. The troop pullout issue is an issue that is extremely important in itself. We have certain contacts with the Germans on this, but let us be realistic, the issue is solely between Poland and the Soviet Union.

[Woycicki] Certain Soviet military voices have said that Poland's suggested conditions for the troop withdrawal are highly undignified. What is your comment?

[Skubiszewski] Poland has great experience in matters relating to Soviet military transit from Germany to the Soviet Union and vice versa, as well as to the constant coming and going of Soviet troops that are stationed in Poland. These things have been going on for decades and have been done in an orderly fashion. Thus, all fears of—and I quote—"undignified conditions for troop withdrawals" are completely unfounded, because nothing like this has ever happened before and will not happen. Poland has not made any new demands in this sphere. Concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Germany, all we want is to conclude an agreement on the matter. The reason for this is that there will be a substantial increase of additional transit traffic and this needs to be regulated. I would like to recall that the normal or so-called routine traffic from Germany to the USSR, and vice versa, is going on all the time without any problems. Thus, there is no basis for these unfavorable comments.

[Woycicki] What stance is Poland going to take in relation to Czechoslovakia's suggestion to consider withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact as an answer to the events in Lithuania? Is it possible for closer regional cooperation between Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague in light of the developing situation in the Soviet Union?

[Skubiszewski] Until now—that is to say this afternoon, January 16—there has not been any such proposition. Late on 14 January, I spoke twice on the telephone with Minister Dienstbier. This was after my earlier interview on the same day. There were no concrete suggestions, but we shall meet next week. The issue of dismantling the military structure and through this finally putting an end to the Warsaw Pact is much older than the Lithuanian crisis. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Lithuanian crisis are distinct matters and each is being tackled according to different categories, and, let us not forget, by different countries. In relation to your question on the regional policy, the policy is not linked to the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

[Woycicki] So despite this stormy period in world politics, the fundamental lines of our foreign policy can be continued?

[Skubiszewski] Yes, above all they must be continued. We must also see to it that they are continued despite the fact that there are difficulties in our negotiations with the USSR in relation to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from

Poland. It is a matter of agreeing on a date for the pullout. This is still outstanding. I never doubted that this would become a difficult issue, but it has become even more complicated as a result of certain changes that are taking place in the USSR. With Minister Shevardnadze there was complete agreement on our cooperation and acceptance of the new Polish situation and Poland's new politics. Shevardnadze understood the changes occurring in Eastern and Central Europe and knew that they are irreversible. I am pleased that a new Soviet foreign minister has been appointed and I look forward to cooperating with the new minister.

This cooperation should go well, especially now that our present relations require close cooperation between our respective ministries to solve certain issues, particularly the treaty on Soviet troops withdrawal and the treaty on the transit arrangements for Soviet troops from Germany to the USSR. These treaties are for all intents and purposes ready and could be signed tomorrow.

[Woycicki] Could the complications occurring in the democratic processes in the Soviet Union have a profound effect on Polish foreign policy? Formerly there was talk of replacing the theory of two enemies with the theory of two friends. Is this still valid and to what extent will unfavorable developments in the USSR create a need for a closer alliance with the West?

[Skubiszewski] Let us not talk of enemies or friends. This is the language of journalistic overstatement, not of the realities of international politics. Poland must have good relations and close cooperation on both its west and east flanks.

The disturbances in the building of democracy in the Soviet Union are an obvious complication that affects international relations, but I want to reiterate that our multilateral and developing links with the USSR are not just a function of what is happening in the Soviet Union. These links are independent. I only have to point to our efforts to enter the European Communities. Although this is a long term thing, it is already being realized in our policy through certain steps we are taking.

Geremek on Lithuania, Troop Pullout, Gulf

AU2201204591 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Jan 91 p 11

[Interview with Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, by Piotr Pacewicz; place and date not given: "Have We Done All We Could for Lithuania?"]

[Text] [Pacewicz] What should be Poland's position towards Lithuania? Should it accept, as the West has done, that stability in the USSR is in our interest? This would imply that the border of Europe is now on the River Bug and not on the Urals. Or should it bravely support the struggle of the Baltic states? At the moment, we seem to be vacillating between these two options.

[Geremek] I do not agree with this view and, on the contrary, I see a logical and consistent approach. I do not think that Poland has any real possibility of influencing the internal situation in the USSR. Nevertheless, the government and Polish society treat Lithuanian problems and misfortunes as very intimate matters. Poland is tied to Lithuania through history, as well as through the ties that come from the presence of a large Polish community there.

We are passionate about our support for national rights in Moldova and Georgia, but Lithuanian matters have priority. This is reflected in the declarations made by Foreign Minister Skubiszewski and the government. One could, of course, ask whether, given the situation, we are doing all that we should be doing and all that the Lithuanians expect of us?

[Pacewicz] The very question I want to ask.

[Geremek] I think that we are on a very narrow dividing line between what we would like to do and what we are able to do. The reception accorded in Poland to Minister Algirdas Brazauskas and Deputy Czeslaw Okinczyc is very closely monitored in Lithuania and acknowledged as proof of our substantial involvement. Poland was the first country to summon the Soviet charge d'affaires after the intervention. Other countries took this step much later. It would be a hollow gesture if only Poland were to start taking steps that led to recognizing Lithuanian statehood.

[Pacewicz] Even if one were to agree with your point of view, is there no room for concrete action that would come between the highly emotional but politically unimportant gestures and the dispatch of a Polish Ambassador to Lithuania? For example, could not, or should not, Poland become a champion of the Lithuanian cause?

[Geremek] One has to remember that the West is only slowly beginning to wake up from its lethargy toward the Baltic republics. The West still pins its hopes for internal stabilization in the USSR to the person of Mikhail Gorbachev and perceives the action of the Baltic republics as a factor of instability in the superpower, which, although weakening, is still powerful and possesses nuclear weapons. We now have a Gulf war, which, just as the Suez invasion in 1956 at the time of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, could deflect the West's attention from our part of the world.

Poland wants Lithuania to become an international issue and wants the world to understand that if this intervention in Lithuania is accepted, it effectively means the end of perestroyka, as well as the end of Gorbachev as an exponent of an unknown political philosophy in the history of the USSR.

[Pacewicz] Could Czechoslovakia's proposal to leave the Warsaw Pact provide a pointer for Polish foreign policy?

[Geremek] High-level talks on this matter are under way and there is a chance that it will lead to coordinated action. A sense of realism dictates, however, that this is action of a symbolic kind, because withdrawal from a moribund Warsaw Pact serves no military or political purpose.

[Pacewicz] What is your opinion of the president's actions? He has stated that he wants to understand the arguments of both sides....

[Geremek] The president is presently refraining from making comments and is letting the government take the initiative. In his first statements he was quite unambiguous. In his inaugural speech, he referred to Lithuania as one of our neighbors....

[Pacewicz] Omitting the Soviet Union, which was surely an unintentional omission.

[Geremek] In any case, he clearly stressed the importance of Lithuania.

[Pacewicz] What do you think about the statement made by Stefan Kisielewski, who was summoned by the president at the most critical moment? Kisielewski is saying that because the West is not sticking its neck out, neither should Poland. Could these words have been prompted by the talk he had with Walesa?

[Geremek] I hope these are the personal views of Mr. Kisielewski, who, as we all know, is a man who likes paradoxes.

[Pacewicz] Why are talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland taking so long?

[Geremek] This aspect has been addressed by the Polish Government properly. The talks at the ministerial level led one to believe that the Soviet pullout could be completed by the end of 1991. Lately, we have observed worrying signals. It would appear that Soviet military circles are beginning to manifest a tendency to delay the whole operation.

[Pacewicz] Will the presence of Soviet troops in Poland become a factor in that political game?

[Geremek] It could play a role in the conflict between the more liberal political groups on the one side and the military and party diehards on the other. The situation in the Baltic republics seems to show that the Soviet leadership does not fully control the Army's actions.

It is very hard to imagine, however, that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the presence of the 45,000-strong Soviet contingent in Poland could be sustained for much longer. They have no significant military purpose.

[Pacewicz] Are you so certain? Do you not share the fears that the West, wishing to maintain Soviet support for the war with Iraq, will allow the Kremlin to return to its imperial tendencies and move its frontiers to the Odra-Nysa [Oder-Neisse] River?

[Geremek] In Soviet politics there is a clear distinction between its internal and external empires. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the former GDR were part of its external empire, and this has now completely disintegrated. I think elements in the Soviet Union fully realize this.

[Pacewicz] What do you mean by Soviet elements?

[Geremek] Both the politicians and the military. The internal empire is being shaken by the collapse of the former relationship between the center and the republics. It looked as if Gorbachev's policies were aiming for a confederation system. That policy has presently collapsed. This has an impact on the situation in Poland purely because we are the immediate neighbors, but this influence is comparable to the influence felt by the rest of Europe. In other words, I do not think that changes—even the most profound reversal—in Soviet politics could turn back Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian evolutions to independence and self determination.

[Pacewicz] What is your vision of the future?

[Geremek] The future of the world depends on the outcome in the Gulf and the Baltic republics. In both cases, our reaction must be the same; namely, to firmly reject the aggression of the stronger against the weaker.

One must hope that military operations in the Gulf will be short-lived, decisive, and lead to the withdrawal of forces. My fear is that the United States will have to stay in the Gulf region for longer and this will be a misfortune.

In Lithuania, the Russians have shown that they still have strength. Having reminded everyone of this, they could withdraw without disgrace and the process of freeing the Baltic states could continue. I am completely convinced that all three Baltic countries will be independent.

[Pacewicz] In this interview you have spoken like a politician who is close to the government. The reality, nevertheless, is that you are one of the most important opposition representatives.

[Geremek] I am the chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, so my task is to put forward the views of the Sejm, not some political party. The political situation in Poland is unclear. I am hoping that we shall advance towards normality and this means that specific political groupings will start articulating their political positions, including their view on international affairs.

Spokesman Claims Progress in Troop Pullout Talks

AU2201132391 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Maria Wagrowska report: "When Will the Pullout Begin?"]

[Text] There is no direct link between Soviet military intervention in Lithuania and the fact that the Soviet Northern Army Group (50,000 troops) is stationed in Poland. The Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Soviet Troops in Poland also stated that it had not observed any troop movements that could be linked to events in Lithuania. Nevertheless, the military operation in Vilnius forces one to look at the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Poland in a completely different light. It touches on the political, psychological, and security aspects of the problem and requires that these troops be withdrawn as soon as possible.

For operational reasons, a Moscow preoccupied with its internal crisis in Lithuania and other Baltic republics may prefer to keep its troops in Poland for longer than presently envisaged. Events in Lithuania show that it is highly desirable to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Poland first and then begin the transport of Soviet units presently in the former GDR. This is also the view of the Polish authorities.

In the meantime, despite progress in Polish-Soviet talks on this issue (the third round has just finished in Moscow), no date for the withdrawal is in sight. This date is a high-level political decision. According to RZECZPOSPOLITA's sources, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski supposedly sent a letter on the subject to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze [Aleksandr Bessmertnykh appointed foreign minister on 15 January]. Asked to confirm this, Deputy Director of the European Department Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas replied that he had no comment, but it was certain that the matter of Soviet troops would be on the agenda during Soviet Defense Minister Yazov's upcoming visit in Warsaw, assuming this still goes ahead.

Kostrzewa-Zorbas said that, in principle, a treaty on Soviet troop withdrawal was ready for signing and he dismissed rumors that no progress on a transit agreement had been made in Moscow.

In connection with the information circulating after talks held by a delegation of the People's Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and republic representatives in the Polish Sejm that the Soviet Union could not guarantee the end of 1991 deadline for troop withdrawals (as requested by the Polish government), we asked Deputy Jerzy Golaczynski, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, to comment. He said: "The talks were held at the Soviet Union's suggestion. It wanted to inform the Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and German legislatures of its position. Polish Sejm deputies argued strongly and unambiguously that the fact of withdrawal was beyond discussion and that they wanted it to take place before the planned transit of Soviet troops in Germany, or, if this proved impossible, to combine the two operations. Soviet deputies argued that the pullout from Poland must follow the pullout from Germany. The Soviet troops in Poland could oversee the transit of troops from Germany. We replied that we were ready to offer our services. The talks were beneficial, but at times difficult and strained. Some of the Soviet deputies told us that they understood our laws, but argued for an understanding of their situation and lack of infrastructure needed for returning troops and families. They maintained that this made it impossible for the Soviet Union to agree to a date. Our meeting ended on a positive note: both sides agreed to press for a rapid agreement in this matter and to continue to monitor the whole process. We are also interested to know where the returning troops are to be finally stationed. The Soviet deputies invited us to visit the Soviet Union.

On 12 January, a Soviet military train from Germany bound for Kaliningrad was halted at the Szczecin-Gumienice station because its transit papers were not in order. After clarification, the train was allowed to continue on its way. These incidents give rise to concern. There are rumors that toward the end of last year, Polish State Railways [PKP] "agreed" to transport Soviet troops from Germany across Poland at an advantageous price.

We asked Deputy Transport Minister Witold Chodakiewicz to comment. He said: "The PKP merely provides the "containers on wheels." It is an important element in the state's policy, but only in a technical sense. I want to underscore that nobody has signed anything. The transit of Soviet troops across Polish territory proceeds in line with earlier agreements. According to an agreement from 1956, the Soviet Union has a right to two supply trains traveling from east to west every 24 hours. There is also the normal transit traffic from Czechoslovakia towards Braniewo, again one or two trains every 24 hours, and the third category is essential transport movement at times of troop relocation. Last year we also had the transport of withdrawn Soviet military equipment following the Vienna treaty. As regards the supposed transport agreement, this might be a reference to the Jachranka Agreement which raised the fee for rail transport for Soviet Army needs (up by 10 percent from 1 January 1991). Presumably the same fee structure will apply to the transport of Soviet troops when the pullout takes place.

Trade Minister Queried on Trade, Gulf War

AU2301104591 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19-20 Jan 91 p 1

[Interview with Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Dariusz Ledworowski by Krzysztof Bien; place and date not given: "A Time Of War, Peace, and Trade"]

[Text] [Bien] War has broken out. Although it is a long way away from us, what effects might it have on the Polish economy?

[Ledworowski] Everything depends on how long it lasts. If it lasts a short while, then, according to the experts—and I can only base my remarks on their opinions—oil prices will settle at the same level as before the crisis. The effect of the war on our balance of payments should, therefore, not be too great.

[Bien] On what oil price is our balance of payments based?

[Ledworowski] Thirty dollars a barrel.

[Bien] It is less than that now.

[Ledworowski] Hence my cautious optimism. The war may last longer, however, and what have I said may not be valid. A $1 difference in the price of oil means a $100 million difference in our balance of payments. So it is difficult to present any firm opinion right now.

[Bien] We have other economic interests in the Middle East apart from oil imports. In what way might the current situation affect them?

[Ledworowski] As far as Iraq is concerned, the situation is clear inasmuch as we have been suffering losses there for many months. We have not been receiving any oil from Iraq, so we have had to buy it from Iran for dollars. The performance of the contracts has stopped. The present situation is new inasmuch as it is dispelling a few illusions about conditions stabilizing and about a resumption of some building projects over there. No, the losses are irretrievable. That especially concerns the Dromex, Polservis, and Polimex-Cekop firms.

[Bien] Let us proceed to other foreign trade topics. The situation in the Soviet Union is changing. Can that have any effect on our economic interests?

[Ledworowski] All the present doubts concerning USSR trade are the result of the unclear situation in that country. Last November we concluded an agreement on new principles of trade. A list of commodities was drafted in December. We still do not know how the remainder of the trade will be implemented, however, because the basic regulations concerning USSR foreign trade are only just being drafted there. For example, they have only just introduced convertible currency trade funds, but no one knows how these will function in practice.

[Bien] What do our exporters say?

[Ledworowski] Some of our exporters are on the verge of concluding new deals.

[Bien] Are these traditional exporters, or new firms?

[Ledworowski] They are mostly traditional exporters, because the old contracts have turned out to be the most valuable ones. The worst problem, however, is the supply of consumer goods and food. Neither of these categories is on the commodities list, and imports from Poland are meant to be financed by the republics; however, the republics still do not know how much convertible currency they will have. We have to be patient, but the situation can change any day.

[Bien] In any case, need we not worry about raw materials?

[Ledworowski] In this sphere, we are well protected by the agreement we have reached. If no political upheavals occur, and one has to consider such an eventuality in the Soviet Union, then we need have no fears. We have gas, we have oil.

[Bien] Yes, but not much.

[Ledworowski] True, but we have been assured that the USSR will sell us its surplus stock. After all, we pay in dollars, and we have a pipeline. So all in all we can receive more oil than the 4.5 million tonnes contained in the agreement.

[Bien] Let us move to the EEC, our associate membership of which is the most important matter. I suppose our trade with the EEC is greater than our trade with anywhere else?

[Ledworowski] Yes. Our exports to the EEC are 50 percent higher than to the CEMA countries. We have already held the first talks with the EEC about our associate membership, and in February we expect a start on talks on the subject of setting up a free trade zone.

[Bien] What can we expect from these talks in a practical sense?

[Ledworowski] It is important for us to gain greater access to EEC markets. Associate membership should abolish all the limits, quantitative restrictions, fees, and price controls that are imposed on us. These are genuine barriers that hinder our EEC exports. The EEC authorities have agreed to abolish these restrictions, but many details require further negotiations. The important thing is that the EEC agrees to assymetry in the process of adaptation. In other words, instead of demanding changes from us straight away, the EEC has agreed to lift some of the restrictions first.

[Bien] What changes are expected from Poland?

[Ledworowski] The question of an internal protection of the agricultural market will be discussed separately. We must also take special care of our interests here, but there are other markets that require protection. We must consider how much protection is required and that depends on the competitiveness of our products. Right now we are only just preparing for talks, so I can give no details. We want the new customs tariff, which is currently being prepared and will come into effect in the middle of the year, as a basis for these talks. In any case, we expect to conclude a treaty on our associate membership of the EEC in June, and we expect to enter the 21st century as a full member of the EEC.

[Bien] There have been lots of economic delegations in Poland and a lot has been said about possible credits; however, it is difficult to detect any practical improvements as a result of all this, no clear structural changes to our economy are to be seen. Will this change?

[Ledworowski] The fact that in an economic sense these visits have not provided much change is not only the

result of inefficient procedures, but also the general political and social situation in Poland. There is still a wait-and-see attitude.

I think a rapid amendment to the Joint Ventures Act will improve this climate. The amendment by itself is not enough, of course, but such changes as abolishing the procedures that presently have to be followed when registering joint venture companies, or allowing the free transfer of profits out of Poland, should encourage people to invest in Poland.

[Bien] I think there is more to it than that. We have to choose the spheres in which the Polish economy should specialize, and adapt our foreign trade program to them.

[Ledworowski] Until now we have not had any basis on which to select a development strategy and this is because of the artificial level of prices and costs. It was impossible to make any comparisons that would determine the practicality of specializing in this or that sphere; however, the situation has been changing since last year. Another anomaly has been removed this year, the division of the market into a dollar sector and ruble sector. Now we can examine which spheres of production would be profitable and make bolder decisions based on objective economic criteria.

Walesa, Bielecki Discuss Information Policy

LD2201143291 Warsaw PAP in English 1131 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 22—President Lech Walesa met with Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz at the Belweder Palace today.

Following the talks with the president, Bielecki said that the meeting was not associated with today's meeting of the Council of Ministers. The three discussed information policy with a view to improving communication between the government and society.

Bielecki Interviewed on State of Economy

LD2201163991 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0750 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Interview with Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki by Gabor Nemes in Warsaw; date not given—recorded, in Polish with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[Text] [Nemes] Your predecessor called himself the prime minister of all Poles. Is that your ambition, or do you wish to hold the title, rather, of the head of the breakthrough government?

[Bielecki] I do not say that I am trying for either continuity or for a breakthrough. I believe it is necessary for us to work so the adaptation to the market economy takes place in the mildest form possible, and so society fully accepts this. Perhaps the difference between the two government teams rests in that we are more liberal regarding our tradition, our views, but for all that we believe it is not possible to build a market economy in Poland without the state's participation.

[Nemes] In that case, it is not entirely clear to me where the political base for your government can be found. Who is in the opposition now in Poland, and who is considered to be in favor of the government?

[Bielecki] It is certain that the president who was elected through direct ballot at free elections is our ally, and some groupings are well-meaning toward us. Taking into consideration that we are in a period before elections, however, it is more profitable for numerous groupings to attack the government and to emphasize its temporary nature.

[Nemes] When I enquired about the government camp, he named President Walesa at first. To what extent does he have a free hand in personnel and political matters?

[Bielecki] If I tell you, even then you will not believe it. It is a ridiculous situation. When I replied to journalists that Walesa knew only four of the 19 ministers they simply cast doubt on my words. They wrote that Walesa already had a prepared list of ministers, and that he had sought a leader, that is a prime minister for this.

[Nemes] Mr. Prime Minister, what do you see as your most important task?

[Bielecki] I believe Poland is already in the phase of the journey toward to a market economy when it is difficult to single out a prominent point. We have complex package plans. In the external economy this would mean a cancellation of part of the debts. Then we must sign the three-year agreement with the IMF as soon as possible; furthermore, we must receive structure and transformation credit from the World Bank. In addition, we want to join the European Community. Among internal matters, what perhaps is most important is a banking system which meets the requirements of a market economy, a development of the financial infrastructure.

[Nemes] What you have listed are important supplementary elements, but if I understand correctly, the Balcerowicz plan will essentially remain.

[Bielecki] The Balcerowicz plan contains five basic theses, which have general validity for the Polish and the Hungarian economy, too. We, naturally, shall not change these, because the basic principes of normal economic management include the need to eliminate prices regulation, to liberalize foreign trade, to overcome inflation, and more or less to establish a balanced budget. The question, however, is how we shall be most effective in the system of these macro-economic categories, so society accepts this process in the meantime.

[Nemes] That is precisely what is at hand. Many voices can be heard from the camp grouped behind Walesa that the government is realizing the program of the Mazowiecki team, which was voted out and rejected by society.

[Bielecki] This casting of blame is quite general, and it stems from the fact that the slogans are often taken into consideration in our country. Less basis is given to the facts. The basic direction is democracy and a market economy. That is the direction in which we must proceed, irrespective of whether Walesa or someone else is in power. Otherwise we shall go back to communism or some sort of modern socialism. The emphasis is on the manner of realization; therefore, in the certain second-class, B-category Poland, in the eastern regions, nothing has happened. The macroeconomic changes have not affected the activity of small towns, villages. What is needed there is not market prices, but small-scale privatization, the demonopolization of trade, state assistance in the transformation of property forms. Mainly, it is necessary to strengthen political pluralism because the fact that Solidarity's Citizens' Committees took over power to a complete extent has not yielded genuine, quality changes for the people there. If wage increases cannot be given, as this would lead to chaos, then it is necessary to demonstrate everyday that something is changing in the given medium.

[Nemes] For all that, it is the standard of living that has the most impact on people's state of being. The World Bank and the creditors, however, demand even more rigorous wages and financial policy from you. Will you tell the Poles that is necessary to tighten the belt even further?

[Bielecki] I hope that the external support will enable the financing of structural transformation. That is a very important element. For example, for the purpose of transforming agriculture, we are earmarking a certain quantity of money in the budget, and the World Bank is also giving a loan for this.

[Nemes] Yet have the external conditions, the credit possibilities, not worsened even more than at the time the Balcerowicz plan began?

[Bielecki] Well, there is a break in Soviet trade, owing to the switchover to free currency, and owing to the complete change in the channels of this trade. Regarding foreign support, however, the situation will certainly not be as bad as last year. Take it into consideration that there was large debate in Parliament last year on direct foreign capital investments, in which a role was played by the fear that the foreign capital would buy up Poland. At the same time, the value of direct investments at the moment is $10 million. Numerous countries, however—Spain, Portugal, and Malaysia—have developed precisely as a consequences of foreign support. In Spain this consitituted $10 billion annually.

[Nemes] I do not believe the West is rushing too much to bring its money here. Indeed, the FRG, which up to now could have been relied on, is preoccupied with the former GDR.

[Bielecki] Look, I do not want to argue with you over who believes or does not believe what; however, this must be viewed as a basic possibility. We alone only push the problems in front of ourselves, but we can accelerate transformation through foreign support. The transition from one system to the other anyway is a process which lasts several years. For that reason, I can say by way of summing up that only a clever compromise between government activity and society can be the sole possibility for us to realize this program in the future.

Skubiszewski Briefs Journalists on Foreign Policy

LD2201234691 Warsaw PAP in English 2220 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 22—During a break in today's debates of the Council of Ministers at which discussed was the international situation Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski spoke to newsmen about the most important issues.

As regards the conflict in the Gulf, Skubiszewski said: As long as the war continues, we will not do much. Thus, we have to think about the future. Not all realize that we succeeded in helping out practically all Poles from Iraq and Kuwait except from seven persons whose fate is not known.

Speaking about Monday meeting in Budapest, Skubiszewski stated: We agreed with the foreign ministers of Hungary and Czechoslovakia that the military structures of the Warsaw Pact should be dissolved in mid-1991. My proposal concerning new alliance agreements with former socialist states met with a big interest.

As concerns the situation in Baltic republics, the foreign minister said:

Poland comes out against solving conflicts by force, and the only right way are negotiations. In my opinion there is no threat of an armed action that could be transferred to Poland as its European and non-European repercussions would be too serious.

Iraq's Treatment of POW's Condemned

AU2301112891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1118 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 23/01/1991—There should be no doubt on which side Romania is, stated Romania's Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase in an interview with "ADEVARUL" newspaper in connection with the Gulf conflict. Nevertheless, he went on, we have had and wish to further have links and channels of communication with Iraq. It is in this context that fall the opportunities offered to the Iraqi Embassy in Bucharest to make known its government's stands.

The Romanian Minister expressed his regret that the war broke out but, he said, it was Iraq which made the military option. The only modality of avoiding further losses of human lives and damage, genuinely motivated by a humanitarian spirit, is the Iraqi troops' soonest possible withdrawal from Kuwait, which would necessarily lead to the cessation of hostilities.

In another string of ideas Adrian Nastase also stated: one should clearly show that Iraq's intention of placing war prisoners in strategic points that could become war targets is a violation of the 1949 Geneva convention on the treatment of war prisoners to which Iraq is a party. Iraq's use of war prisoners as a human shield would be a serious violation of human rights in general and of the protection of war prisoners in particular.

Iliescu Chairs Defense Council Meeting on Gulf

AU1901184191 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1706 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/1/1991—Saturday, January 19, 1991, a meeting of the country's Higher Defence Council was held under the chairmanship of Romania's President Ion Iliescu.

The reports made on the occasion evinced the latest political and military developments in the conflict area, and enabled an evaluation of the efficiency of the measures taken in the previous meetings.

To avoid any incident which would have particularly serious human, political and diplomatic repercussions in the current conditions, the Higher Defence Council demanded the Ministry of the Interior to urgently take all due steps to recover the armament procured in any way and illegally held by any person in Romania's territory.

The Council expresses its satisfaction for the maturity with which the country's population works in the present-day complex conditions to ensure a normal course of the social life.

Defense Minister Expresses Views on Gulf War

AU2201164291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1142 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 22/01/1991—In General V.A. Stanculescu's opinion the war in the Gulf could last three-to-four weeks, seeing it optimistically, while considering also a potential shift in Iraq's stance. If the Iraqi Army engaged in serious fights, taking into account the balance of forces of the land troops, the war might take two-to-three months, the Romanian general also assesses.

Referring to the concrete measures Romania took after the beginning of war in the Gulf, the general specifies: the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior strengthened the guard over economic and military units, embassies and, generally, over all units which can be potential targets for terroristic attacks.

Answering a question raised by the daily "ADEVARUL", which publishes the interview, with regard to the Romanian Army's equipment, General Stanculescu states: We called on some of the western countries to finalize a perspective plan. In this respect, we requested NATO's accord of principle. We are expecting a favorable answer to purchase military equipment from France, Italy, Germany, within the limits of the same figures approved for basic technology.

In another sequence of ideas, General Stanculescu—who is the minister of national defense—specifies that "CADA [Committee of Action for Democratization of the Army] committees virtually do not exist." He also says this year "we shall perform autumn maneuvers to check the training level of the whole Army. All arms will be involved without making it a show of force but an opportunity to draw conclusions for the future.

Spokesman Gives Country's Position on Gulf War

AU2201172391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1652 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 22/01/1991—We consider that even now the Iraqi leadership can and must adopt the necessary measures to withdraw its troops from Kuwait, which might lead to the cessation of fighting, all while avoiding heavy casualties and damage, the government spokesman, Secretary of State Bogdan Baltazar, said during his weekly press conference. He added: The Romanian Government expressed its willingness to contribute to the efforts intended to provide for the applications of the UN Security Council's pertinent resolutions, which will implicitly put an end to military hostilities.

It is our opinion, Mr. Baltazar opined, that the settlement of the Gulf crisis might pave the road to an equitable political resolution of the issues facing that area for decades, going down as a contribution to detente and dialogue in international relations.

Spokesman's Statement Explained

AU2201190191 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1824 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 22/01/1991—Relative to Roman's readiness, recently made public, to contribute to the UN peace-keeping forces, Government Spokesman Bogdan Baltazar explained that this had nothing to do with the idea of Romania's participation in the military actions of the multinational Gulf forces, as it has been misunderstood. As far as the Gulf conflict is concerned, any external demarches outstepping the measures already taken by the Supreme Council of Defense for National Security and Normal Ongoing of Life, the government reasserts that it considers the express authorization by the Parliament as indispensable and, if necessary, it will act accordingly.

Brucan Criticizes Soviet Action Against Lithuania

AU2201111391 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 15 Jan 91 pp 1,6

[Silviu Brucan article: "Mikhail Gorbachev's Fatal Mistake"]

[Text] The policy of the use of force to compel the Soviet republics to accept the new constitutional formula designed to maintain the union structure is not only counterindicated, but also a boomerang that can turn against its own initiator with a devastating strength. The sending of Soviet Army tanks to besiege the Vilnius legislature and the forced enlistment of Baltic youth, who do not want to serve in an occupation army (what can be the value of such an army?), have led to a tragic and inevitable denouement: the shooting of Baltic independence fighters. An abominable crime which filled the entire civilized world with revulsion! The "Gorby" phenomenon is over in the West.

The political mistake is all the more serious as the Baltic region is the only one "ripe" enough for the market economy. As for the rest of the Union, there is little hope of that, because everything runs counter to the market spirit.

The man who, with unexpected courage, opened up a new era in contemporary history, the rightful recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, broke his own neck. Yes, Mikhail Gorbachev signed his condemnation with his own hand, and I do not think the tactical versatility he has given so much proof of in so many critical situations can save him now.

As a matter of fact, as far as the national problems are concerned, Gorbachev has embarked on the wrong path from the very start and has stubbornly stuck to that line to the last. This line, which turned the communist zone of the world into an explosive boiler of national conflicts, from Tibet to Estonia and Yugoslavia, is rooted neither in Stalin's brutal methods, nor in Lenin's cosmetic guidelines, but rather in the head of the founder of scientific socialism, Karl Marx. He is the one who, in the "Communist Manifesto," proclaimed the thesis that once class antagonisms are removed, the hostile relationships between nations will disappear, too. This is a fundamental theoretical error! As I said in my books, although social classes and ethnic groupings do interact in history, they have different historical roots and individual evolutionary dynamics. The communist leaders suffered from an exclusivist fixation on the first type of social aggregate, namely the classes, which they subordinated to the second type, that is to nations and nationalities. Lenin proclaimed the right of peoples to self-determination, but subordinated it to the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In reality, there is no mechanical relationship between classes and nations; their interests are often contradictory, as proven by the entire history of "fraternal" relations among the socialist countries. Now, when the communist dictatorships have been toppled, nationalism burst out in all Soviet republics and obviously in the entire Eastern Europe.

With the tendency so familiar to us of painting an idyllic picture of social realities, Gorbachev said at the CPSU Congress in 1986: "In the Soviet Union, the nationality problems inherited from the past were successfully resolved. Shortly afterward, the violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan broke out, to be immediately followed by the explosive events in Georgia and Turkmenia and later by the organized and well thought out movements in the Baltic countries and the Republic of Moldova, which were crowned by the proclamation of their independence. Gorbachev's reaction to all this was something like a reflex of the old traditions prevailing at the Petersburg Imperial Court, whenever a revolt was breaking out in some province: the army! In the Baltic countries, he also practiced the entire range of economic pressures, including the blackmail with the interruption of oil and gas deliveries.

In March 1990, I had an opportunity to test the limits of glasnost. I granted an interview to a PRAVDA reporter, in which (to beat around the bush) I pleaded—in connection with the nationality problem—for the application of the same "new thinking" methods that brought Gorbachev historic successes in the relations with the United States and the Western powers: the effort to understand and take into consideration the interests of the adversary; readiness for compromise when negotiations reach a deadlock; and, particularly renunciation of any kind of pressures and threats, which are not recommended when dealing with any type of problem pertaining to the field of national relations. I even used the metaphor of shooting an own goal, like in soccer. The correspondent was enthusiastic, but he warned me that he is "not too influential" and the interview might not be published. He added, however, that, given the prominence of the interviewee, the interview would certainly be sent "higher-up." Indeed, the interview was not published, but I received a very alluring invitation to visit Moscow.

I went there in June and noted that, while my lectures enjoyed a favorable public reception in scientific, academic, and university institutes, I was faced with an obtuse stubbornness in the Kremlin, a stubbornness derived from what Lenin called "the great Russian chauvinism." I was told, in a way familiar to me, that nationalistic movements only aimed at undermining perestroyka. I replied with many examples, including some from our country, that if not enough attention is paid to national conflicts, the consequence is that nationalistic outbursts can acquire a virulence that is stronger than the economic reform and even than the requirements for the consolidation of democracy. This is exactly what is happening in the Soviet Union. Once more we can see how difficult it is to apply rationality in the sphere of national problems. In fact, Gorbachev did not realize that at the end of the 20th century—in a world consisting of nations with their own culture, language, and identity—there is no place for empires, in any form.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Warsaw Pact Issue

AU1801160391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1015 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 18/1/1991—Answering a question about Romania's possible disjoining from the Warsaw Treaty, Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, told a news conference held in Bucharest on January 17: "The position of Romania's Government is quite clear. This treaty has lost its raison d'etre, the ideological binder that was its mainstay. Consequently this treaty, built upon this binder, will no longer have an object. We all know that negotiations are underway on complete restructuring and of disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty's military component. We are for the process of negotiations to be completed, for the termination of the treaty's military activity, as the countries participating in it have established."

Delegation Holds Talks With European Parliament

AU1901184291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1703 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/1/1991—As part of the demarches taken by Romania's Parliament toward the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, a delegation led by Senator Oliviu Gherman, vice-president of the Senate, paid visits to Paris and Brussels on January 17 and 18, shows a communique of the press and information department of Romania's Parliament.

The delegation had talks with the leaders of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council Of Europe, of the European Parliament and the European Community Commission and tabled them the preliminary conclusions of the commission inquiring into the June 13-15, 1990 events, the report of the commission inquiring into the March 1990 events in Tirgu Mures as well as the draft constitution of Romania.

The preliminary conclusions on the June 13-15, 1990 events completed the talks conducted with the delegations the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament sent to Bucharest last November. The conclusions included two formulations, namely that of the National Salvation Front, the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania, the National Unity Party of Romania, on the one hand, and that of the National Liberal Party, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, the Christian and Democratic National Peasant Party and the Parliamentary Social Democratic-Ecologic Group, on the other hand.

Majority Supports Presidency Over Monarchy

AU2201210591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1926 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 22/1/1991—The great majority of Romanians think that the head of the Romanian state should be a president, not a king, shows a nation-wide poll conducted by the Romanian Institute of Public Opinion (IRSOP), between 12 and 16 January, 1991, on a 4,190 sample batch from all counties.

80 per cent of those questioned opt for a president and 13 par cent for a king. 76 per cent think that most of the citizens prefer a president at the head of the state and only 6 per cent think that the majority favor a king. 76 per cent do not agree to a former King Mihai von Hohenzollern's comeback at the helm of the state, 16 per cent do, while 8 per cent are undecided. Only 7 per cent consider that the majority agrees with the return of former King Mihai, while 70 per cent think otherwise. 57 per cent of the subjects have a rather unfavorable opinion about the former king, 21 per cent think well of him. Pro-monarchic views are shared by 12 per cent of the women 15 per cent of the men, 15 per cent of the youths aged 18-24, 12 per cent of the adults aged 25 to 64 and 19 per cent of the elderly over 64.

By spheres of activity, pupils, students and elders on retirement hold the highest ratio among royalists, by 21 and 20 per cent respectively, while peasants and workers hold the lowest ratios by 9 and respectively 11 per cent. Pro-monarchists are more numerous among town people (13 to 18 per cent), and less numerous among rural people (11 per cent). 12 per cent of them are Romanians and 27 per cent Hungarians.

Monarchy supporters in the various historical provinces stand at 18 per cent in Banat, 21 per cent in Crisana, [figure indistinct] per cent in Dobrogea, 11 per cent in Moldova, 11 per cent in Walachia, 13 per cent in Oltenia, 13 precent in Muntenia and 20 per cent in Bucharest.

Defense Minister Supports Expression of Patriotism

AU1801181591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1627 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 18/01/1991—"It is rather surprising that there has been less and less talk about homeland and patriotism—the lasting values a people cannot exist without—after the December revolution," said Colonel-General Victor Stanculescu, Romanian minister of national defense, in an article in "LIBERTATEA". "It is wrong to consider that one should give up promoting patriotism just because during the years of dictatorship the feeling of love for the country was a component in the education of the masses, a target of the 'Song to Romania' national festival," he also said adding that, indeed, during the years of dictatorship the patriotic demarche had been essentially channeled towards a growing personality cult. However, our freedom was regained in December 1989 through the sacrifices of the people, the feeling of true love for the country should regain its legitimate rights.

"To let ourselves dragged in total culpability without discernment," Mr. Stanculescu said in the same article, "means to play the game of those who want to bring the Romanian people to its knees in its own country so that they may dictate the policy it should pursue, a policy intended to serve foreign interests. [sentence as received] We have an industry that is not below those of the other former socialist countries. Are we afraid to admit it lest we should be accused of praising the former regime? This is a terrible fault in our thinking which, unfortunately, is supported by part of the mass media," Mr.Stanculescu also showed.

In spite of the enemies we had along the years and in spite of the vicissitudes of history," the minister added, "we resisted and we will resist on this land because nobody could deprive us of our glorious past, nobody could stifle the sacred urge of our forefathers. This is the explanation of our long existence. Let us not forget who we were, who we are and whereto we are heading, let us be always aware of our historical rights over the Romanian land," Colonel-General Victor Stanculescu said in conclusion.

Joint Indian Statement Issued on Gulf Crisis

LD2301105691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1010 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—In a joint statement issued today on talks between Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar and Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Vidhya Charan Shukla, India and Yugoslavia maintain that the most urgent task currently facing the nonaligned countries is finding a peaceful solution to the Gulf war.

The statement stresses that the two ministers expressed their grave concern over the start of hostilities in the Gulf despite all the peace efforts, which Yugoslavia, as chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, and India, as a member of the movement, have invested.

The ministers of the two countries agreed to strengthen their efforts to find an urgent political solution to the crisis in accordance with UN Secuity Council resolutions. It was also agreed that consultations should be held with other members of the Nonaligned Movement, members of the UN Security Council, and with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, the statement says.

The Indian foreign minister left Belgrade this morning.

Demarches Issued on Popov, Mitsotakis Statements

LD1801015491 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1901 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 17 (TANJUG)—The Bulgarian and Greek charges d'affaires in Belgrade were today summoned separately to the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat and handed demarches on account of statements made by Bulgarian Prime Minister Dimitar Popov and his Greek counterpart, Constantinos Mitsotakis.

Mitsotakis and Popov at a joint news conference held in Sofia on January 12 this year negated the existence of Macedonian national minorities in their countries.

The Yugoslav Government said in the demarches that the act was completely out of line with the declared intentions to promote relations and cooperation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and Greece and Yugoslavia.

The statements are a repetition of well-known stands which have always been the cause of of difficulties in Yugoslavia's links with Greece and Bulgaria and a burden to relations in the Bakans, the demarches said.

Puzzlement was expressed over the fact that the Bulgarian and Greek sides were doing this at a time when the Balkan countries are endeavoring to to become active participants in positive European processes and basing their relations on principles of the Paris charter of the CSCE. This also includes respecting and promoting the rights of all national groupings. Only this can represent a lasting basis for goodneighbourly relations in the Balkans, and a factor of participation in democratic processes in Europe, the demarches said.

Reportage on Federal Order To Return Weapons

Special Presidency Session Urged

LD2201232391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2159 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Ljubljana, Jan 22 (TANJUG)—The leaders of Slovenia's Reformed Communists and Croatia's Party of Democratic Changes (formerly Communists), Ciril Ribicic and Ivica Racan respectively, proposed Tuesday that a special session of the Yugoslav State Presidency be held to clarify the order on the return of weapons.

Twelve days ago the Yugoslav Presidency ordered the disbanding and disarming of all para-military units. The deadline for the disarming expired at midnight last night but it has still not been definitively clarified whether the order also related to the territorial defence and special units formed by the authorities in the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia.

Racan told a news conference in Ljubljana that "the danger of an escalation of the crisis in Yugoslavia is very great."

He said that the militarization of the country was the biggest threat to democracy.

Racan added that "everyone must defend sovereignty with all means, even weapons."

Federal Defense Council Gives View

LD2201140191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1306 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—The Federal Secretariat for National Defense today sent the SFRY Asembly a reply to a question by delegate Vilko Jelen on the formation of paramilitary organizations. The Federal Secretariat stresses that a detailed reply to this question concerning the formation of illegal paramilitary organizations, whose form of action, organization, and planned objectives give rise to the conclusion that these are terrorist party organizations, can be found in a report sent previously by the Secretariat to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly.

The reply stresses that the Federal Secretariat for National Defense will present additional, incontestable facts connected with this issue at the time and in the way it deems necessary, depending on the implementation of the SFRY Presidency's order on the return of weapons.

Mesic Views Possible Military Option

LD2201213891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2047 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Zagreb, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—There is no danger of a military option, Stipe Mesic told Croatian Television on his return to Zagreb from today's session of the SFRY Presidency.

The only thing that will be done in connection with the order to return weapons is that the military services will conduct proceedings against individuals who have not observed the law, said SFRY Presidency Vice President Stipe Mesic.

Speaking about the course of today's session, he said that it was a regular session with a normal agenda, except for the fact that, at the request of Bosnia-Hercegovina, a more precise interpretation of the order on the reclamation of weapons was given.

Noting that a statement from the session had already been put out, Mesic added that "the most important thing is that there will not be any movements of units of the Yugoslav People's Army, or any kind of actions", and that "there is no danger of a military option."

The military services will conduct proceedings against individuals who have not observed the law, but this can be interpreted in various ways, Mesic said.

The order certainly does not relate to regular units of the police—including both the reserve and active forces and territorial defense; they are excluded. The fact that some think, however, that in addition to these there exist some other units is another matter. This has to be proven, Mesic said.

As far as we are concerned, there are no other units. There is a paramilitary organization, and that is in Knin. I believe that in Knin they have to realize that the Republic of Croatia must function like any other state, and that they must be loyal to the republican government. I believe that neither the Army nor the Yugoslav Presidency can help them here, Stipe Mesic said in conclusion.

Chance for Disarming 'Missed'

LD2201185991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1819 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, 22 January (TANJUG)—At its session today the SFRY Presidency, presided over by Dr. Borisav Jovic, examined and adopted a report of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense on implementing the SFRY Presidency order of 9 January on the disarmament of illegally armed formations.

It was concluded that the order has been only partially implemented, and that the opportunity to disarm illegally armed formations without prosecution—i.e. without the direct involvement of legal bodies—has been missed. The SFRY Presidency concludes that military, judicial, and all other competent bodies are obliged to perform their tasks and duties based on the law.

The SFRY Presidency again stresses that the actions of competent bodies undertaken in accordance with law in no way constitute a denial of or an attack on legal government institutions in any republic in our country, but are a consistent implementation of legal measures against those who have violated the law; therefore, republican and all other competent bodies and institutions have to consisently act in accordance with law.

The SFRY Presidency concludes that spreading an atmosphere of fear of an alleged intervention by the Yugoslav People's Army is unfounded. The creation of an anti-army attitude is also unacceptable, because the implementation of law in this sphere is an important precondition for a peaceful, democratic, and constitutionally based process of the social changes in Yugoslavia that are under way.

The SFRY Presidency today discussed the latest developments in the Gulf. It was pointed out that the prolongation and exacerbation of the conflict, apart from human and material casualties, would bring even more serious consequences.

The SFRY Presidency approves the activities of the federal bodies regarding developments in the Gulf. It concludes that Yugoslavia, as the chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, should continue to contact individual nonaligned countries, other partners, and participants in the armed conflict to make the maximum contribution to the process of finding a solution that would put an end to further war operations in the Gulf.

The SFRY Presidency has also considered the economic consequences of the Gulf war for our country, and has instructed the Federal Executive Council to continue monitoring the situation and to propose and undertake appropriate measures.

Daily Views Arms Smuggling

AU1901211991 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jan 91 p 2

[V. Ilic report: "Rifles of (Un)clear Origin"]

[Text] Belgrade—The (un)confirmed reports about the mass import (smuggling) of arms that have recently been filling newspaper columns were given a certain kind of official stamp on 9 January by the order from the SFRY Presidency on the disarmament of all irregular groups and individuals. Not even the responsible investigative services probably know in detail everything that has actually happened and is happening and how, but some things are already becoming obvious even now.

When some weeklies recently carried a photograph of a member of the new Croatian special forces posing with an SAR-80 (CIS [expansion unknown] 5.56) automatic rifle, it was clear that the arsenal of some regular units in the country has been expanded with atypical arms, that is to say, arms that are not standard for our circumstances. As well as the domestic version of "Kalashnikovs" (the Kragujevac automatic M-70 in several variations that the Yugoslav People's Army uses, among other things), the special units of the Croatian constabulary have also had at their disposal "Skorpio" and "Heckler-Koch" automatic personal defense weapons—that could have been seen during last year's activity in Banija.

The automatic with a CIS caliber of 5.56 (obviously the technical successor to the better-known American relative M-16) is undoubtedly a new weapon in our country. Because it is produced in Singapore (Chartered Industries of Singapore), there is no doubt that it reached this country relatively recently because Slovenia's territorial units had the same automatic guns at the recent meeting in Kocevska Reka. It is interesting that the standard ammunition of 7.62 mm caliber is being produced in our factories for domestic use and that the "new acquisitions" use 5.56 mm caliber, which in itself probably means that there is also a supply of ammunition from abroad.

The interest in the new, either legally or illegally acquired, arms started to roll and began to grow after Primoz Kalisnik's article in DELO PLUS, which was supplemented by the Trieste daily TRST DANAS. Even specific institutions were mentioned that have supposedly participated and mediated in "the unlawful smuggling of U.S. weapons"—the Alliance of Slovene Sports Societies and "Intereuropa" in Kopar. The Kopar people and the Alliance have resolutely denied these allegations. Reagarding the dilemma over whether the automatics are American or from Singapore, reliable information cannot at the moment explain this because the M-16 rifle and the Singaporean SAR-80 are visually and technically very similar. Or perhaps this is a question of both automatics being acquired?

Regarding the DELO PLUS article, the Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa has in the meantime announced criminal proceedings against the journalist Primoz Kalisnik, which, as has been announced, will be joined by the Alliance of Sports Societies and the Kopar Intereuropa. Whatever happens, the Trieste daily has implicated Sandi Grubelic, well-known from the Trend car affair, in the purchase of arms from "Swiss dealers." According to Grubelic, however, the supply channel extends through Slovenia and into Croatia, as TRIESTE TODAY writes, but the arms transactions have also been of interest to the Trieste police. Janez Jansa nevertheless claims that Grubelic has nothing whatsoever to do with the purchase of arms for Slovenia's use.

The newly acquired arms also include the "Eastern variant"—"Kalashnikov" automatics. As many as 36,000 of these guns have allegedly been imported by the Zagreb firm "Astra." There are increasingly loud (un)confirmed stories that "Kalashnikovs" are secretly crossing the Austrian and Hungarian borders in unknown quantities and end up in the hands of private owners. According to some theories, these automatic rifles come from the Eastern countries that Warsaw Pact troops are withdrawing from and arms (not exactly modern but very efficient for the purpose) are being sold because moving them is expensive.

The spinning wheel of importing and smuggling arms—no matter what kind and to whom they belonged—has undoubtedly become interesting not only from the point of view of the media but also from the point of view of security above all. If one adds to this the (unknown) amount of money—that is, foreign currency—that is used to pay for these arms, it is obvious that Yugoslavia is acquiring yet another serious headache apart from the dinar one.

[The following passage appears boxed within the body of the item]

Imports Only 15 Percent

According to known figures, Yugoslavia imports just 15 percent of arms and military equipment, equipment which it is thought would be too expensive for our producers. The other 85 percent is produced by the domestic special purpose industry according to its own projects or licenses. Regarding the production of ammunition for domestic standardized infantry armaments, we are one of the few countries that do not depend on imports.

Finance Officials Warn of Financial 'Collapse'

AU2001213891 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12-13 Jan 91 p 13

[J. Kesic report: "Return or Collapse"]

[Excerpt] Belgrade—The collapse of the financial system will be unavoidable if all questions in this field are not quickly and thoroughly analyzed and resolved. Monetary policy was the last defense from collapse, but now it, too, has been breached with the illegal issue of 18.3 billion dinars by the National Bank of Serbia. It is therefore expected that all the money that has been illegally issued will be returned by the end of next week, otherwise the system will not be able to avoid collapse.

These were the serious warnings made to the delegates of the SFRY Assembly's Finance Committee by Federal Finance Secretary Branimir Zekan and SFRY National Bank Director Dusan Vlatkovic. As they explained, if the irregularly issued money is not returned as soon as possible, other republics will, logically, do the same. Then where will we be? Hyperinflation will return, the reform will fail, and, according to Zekan, the present Federal Executive Council will refuse to work under such conditions.

The lack of financial discipline can be seen at every turn. Public spending has been exceeded by 117 billion dinars, the payment of personal incomes was exceeded by 57 billion, and 12.1 billion dinars was not paid into the federal budget by the end of last year. After everything else, there was an incursion into the monetary system, Zekan said.

Financial disobedience has been on the rise since the middle of last year, but nothing illegal was done until this incursion by Serbia into the monetary system, Dusan Vlatkovic said. In the last three months of 1990, there were more serious irregularities in banks that were using

the compulsory money reserves and were raising greater than prescribed loans to ensure liquidity. [passage omitted]

Arms Collection Completed in Serbia

AU2201151691 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] The action of collecting arms and ammunition, as ordered by the SFRY Presidency, has been completed in Serbia. According to the republican secretariat for internal affairs, citizens of Albanian nationality led the way in returning the illegally held arms in Kosovo. In Vojvodina too, some individuals returned arms which they were not legally entitled to have.

The republican secretariat for internal affairs stresses that during this action arms were taken away from individuals only because paramilitary formations do not exist in Serbia.

Jovic Delivers Speech on 'Political Future'

LD1601231591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1442 GMT 16 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, 16 Jan (TANJUG)—Examination of the political future of our country, which is the topic of this session of the SFRY Presidency, was imposed on us by everyday life. It springs from the inability of our state and its institutions to function normally, which also applies, I imagine, to the normal life of citizens themselves. This was stated, according to unauthorized [neautorizovan] minutes, by SFRY Presidency President Dr. Borisav Jovic in his opening speech at the 10 January Presidency session, at which the political future of Yugoslavia was discussed.

Too much has been happening and has happened that has led to deterioration and resulted in the present situation. Efforts to halt these trends have not yielded fruit. It is the last moment for us to get out of this serious situation in a sensible and negotiated manner. The responsibility of those of us sitting here today is exceptionally great, both because of the position that we hold and because of the real political power that we represent, but above all before the concerned citizens who expect and are calling on us to put an end once and for all to the uncertainties that have worn them to the limit.

The most important thing today is that we conduct our talks in an atmosphere of tolerance and openness. It will not help if we exchange accusations or haggle over who started or who is most to blame for the present situation. It will also not help if we attribute to each other evil intentions for the future. Let us proceed from the known fact, Jovic said, that no one can impose anything on anyone else, and that we can choose the path we wish to follow for our future. Our aim is to find a way to live together, as well as to find a way of separating peacefully and in a civilized manner if we are unable to agree on coexistence. Today's talks, Borisav Jovic said, concluding the introductory part of the session, could be a good beginning if we approach them with patience, openness, and tolerance.

Following a several-hour-long discussion, Dr. Borisav Jovic, closing the session, said that the contributions were diverse in both their approach and substance and "unfortunately, in their orientations as to the ways out of the situation." The debate was open, sincere, and constructive, and provided an opportunity for everyone to lay his cards on the table. How to extricate ourselves is a different matter, but today we all have a much clearer idea of what proposals and opinions individual republics have in mind.

We are also faced with the question of how to survive without any catastrophe while working on the solutions, and how to resolve these difficult issues "when the chances for convergence are unfortunately very slim." In my view, Jovic said, we, all of us, must come down to earth, abandon daydreaming, stop idealizing and philosophising, and rid ourselves of the dogmas that are the cause of our present situation. By "dogmas" I mean some of the "ideal" solutions for the future of Yugoslavia and some of the "ideal" solutions for our coexistence.

"At this moment we are far from a single solution for our future, very far, I would say." At the same time, however, Jovic said, we must continue searching for solutions with even more vigor than before. We cannot stop searching for solutions in a peaceful way. We must do our utmost to find solutions in a peaceful way—either through joint efforts or not at all. We cannot allow the country to sink into chaos for "we will be responsible both personally and as a body if we allow chaos in the country."

If we fail to come "down to earth"—to talk openly and practically about how we have been affected by the crisis and how to resolve it—the SFRY Presidency's agenda will turn into chaos, and "we will have no time to discuss the ways out." We must all give this some serious thought, as this can all happen as early as "tomorrow." We must not shut our eyes to the facts. If we are to do that, we would cause even more calamity to both our state and our peoples.

According to Jovic, the key problem is "whether we could or could not agree to living in one state." Let's leave aside the decision on what kind of state this would be. Bearing in mind all the differences, we should concentrate on how to achieve this. It is both rational and acceptable to sit down and examine what functions the state would have. Let us see whether we can organize a state with functions that could ensure a certain degree of partnership so we could live within the same borders, i.e., the functions that would be efficient so everyone could be satisfied, "but that would give the maximum autonomy to republics, nations, etc." This is one of the most acceptable and most frequently mentioned options.

At the same time, "no one should have a lesser or a greater share in these functions; we should be able to discuss everything."

Jovic said that the other approach is also legitimate—they must both be considered—"to organize the relations in Yugoslavia in the way Kucan and Tudjman described it;" to carry out the dismantling of Yugoslavia and its present functions; to return them to republics, make them independent, and only then put them in a position to conduct talks about the future, Yugoslav economic and other forms of integration into Europe, or whatever anybody wants.

This is the approach that would presuppose that we should agree on one Yugoslav document or some form of a law that would regulate how we should do it, because everyone has a different opinion about it. I think that this is legitimate, and that we should talk openly about it, that we need such an approach because we could very easily end up with a combined solution.

Jovic also spoke against dogmatization—that we can have either one thing or another. Talks would not be possible if we dogmatized. He said he had taken a stand ("the first solution is more rational and better"), but that his stand was not essential. We should adopt an approach to both solutions "to see where we stand."

Jovic went on to say that discussions on Yugoslavia's political future should define and clarify the problems linked with the republics and nations casting their vote on this issue. Likewise, he advocated the functioning of a legal system until a solution is found. "The FEC managed to obtain a minimum which represents a framework and I have nothing against this being discussed and, above all, supported." We can find no solution at all if we in any way depart from the legal system individually. Many problems would most certainly arise here, but we could save the situation if we all wanted it, and if we showed tolerance, "so confrontations are not bigger than necessary."

The SFRY Presidency president said that there is no doubt at all that none of the issues that were decisive for the country's past, present, and future could or can be resolved without republics. "We could, however, achieve this in an institutionalized way." None of the decisions made in the SFRY Assembly—and it is competent to decide about changes to the Constitution—can be endorsed without the consent of the republics and provinces. I, therefore, see no reason for the exclusion of federal services from further agreements—if the reason behind this is that they would hinder the republics from expressing their own will. If this should in fact, however, mean that there is no longer a federation, we cannot give our consent, Jovic noted, because "we took the pledge before the Constitution and the law to see them adhered to until they are changed, and it is up to you to change it in this established procedure [sentence as received]. Let us please deal with this issue in a compromising and tolerant way."

As for the legitimacy of this Presidency, its members are elected by the SFRY Assembly. "You are welcome to raise the question of the legitimacy of your representatives in your own republics. Let us not get into a situation where we have to humiliate each other. It is simply not possible to work in this way," Jovic said.

As far as international assistance is concerned, it is a very sensitive question, Jovic assessed. I do not dispute anyone's right to make such a suggestion and this may be with the best intentions, but we are talking here about the interests and aspirations of our nations, which can only be legitimately felt and stated by those who represent these nations. "If we have reached a point where we who represent these nations feel that we are unable to represent them, we should submit our resignations." Quite simply, any decision being offered from outside will come up against the same "wall" as those who disagree with it. "I personally do not feel that this is useful at the present time. Likewise, I consider that this would be degrading for those of us who are responsible to our people. This can be discussed—it remains open—but I wanted to express my opinion."

If we have accepted political pluralism, Jovic went on, we must then accept the possibility that Yugoslavia is living with the victory of differing political parties in different parts of the country, in different municipalities and in different regions. Furthermore, that the Yugoslav Assembly is made up of different parties, that one party may dominate in it, another in a republic, and so on. If we are unable to accept such pluralism, then we are not up to making the transition to a pluralistic system, because we are a multinational country. Let us allow political life to take its course, Jovic added, let us seek democratic solutions, and practice will show what is best, and what is most useful will prevail. We should not bring this issue into our work, except as a common assumption that political pluralism is acceptable to all, and who wins and where—what will be, will be.

In addition to an agreement with the participants in the discussion on the next session of the SFRY Presidency and the continuation of talks on the political future of Yugoslavia, Jovic said that in the meantime it would be highly desirable to agree on meetings of republican leaderships. This is a matter for the republics, and we strongly recommend that they hold talks between all of them if possible, particularly between those where matters are unclarified, to move closer and understand each other better.

In conclusion, Jovic assessed that useful, frank, and comprehensive talks had taken place, which contained all possibilities and all proposals. "We have agreed", he added, "that what has been said here is not a secret."

In two weeks time we will meet again in the same composition, but in the meantime all proposals made here—views and suggestions—will be studied in the republics, and as many inter-republican talks as possible will take place to find common ground, common views,

to bring stands closer together, and to be able to continue to work here more constructively, SFRY Presidency President Borisav Jovic said in conclusion.

Prime Minister Markovic Meets Slovene Leaders

LD1801201491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1408 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 18 Jan (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Federal Executive Council [FEC], led by its president, conducted talks with all members of the Slovene government today, within the framework of the talks that FEC President Ante Markovic is holding with all republics. The subject of the talks was how to ensure the minimum functioning and, of course, financing of the federation.

In the course of his talks with the press, FEC President Ante Markovic said that he feels optimistic after the talks with republics—they are yet to be held in Macedonia and Serbia—because there are perfectly justified reasons for such optimism, according to him.

While implementing reforms in this country, the FEC has managed to initiate a whole series of changes, from economic moves to the introduction of political pluralism. All these developments are in progress, regardless of the success of their implementation.

In contrast with other countries, where a tendency of erosion has been noticed, we have consistently carried out a transformation from one system into another. This has been sucessfull at all levels of society, up to multiparty elections that were conducted in a democratic way, without incidents and without blood, something not really characteristic of the country in which we live.

In Markovic's words, this process started stalling in mid-1990. During the preelection struggle we have witnessed an incursion upon our financial sphere, the monetization of primary money issue, as well as a cessation of contributions to the federal budget. The FEC has been warning for months about the fatal consequences of all this, but the federal government had no means of preventing it, nor was it capable of regulating the turnover of commodities.

According to Markovic, when the FEC discovered the incursion and violations, it took rigorous measures and proposed certain changes in the law.

The investigations carried out and measures taken indicate that we have already achieved certain results, the prime minister assessed.

Markovic informed journalists that within a deadline of seven days all those who committed the incursion into the monetary system will return to the original state of affairs.

Emphasizing that in the multiparty elections in Yugoslavia differing political options won, Markovic said that the FEC considers that, on the question of future relations, it is necessary to agree on whether coexistence in Yugoslavia is possible in the future.

Negotiations on this should be carried out this year, and no political prejudices should be involved in the process. The questions of whether this will be a federation, confederation or something else, or whether it will be decided that we should separate, should all be settled by agreement in a civilized, decent manner, without the use of force.

This agreement calls for time, half a year, perhaps a year, or even less, when it is a question of reaching agreement on the future. Certain conditions should exist for this. I believe it is essential that we should reach agreement on what are the minimal functions of this society that would prevent the disintegration of the country, the erosion of the system, anarchy and chaos, which would not only prevent such an agreement, but also put a stop to the changes.

I believe that it is in the interests of all parts of the country to create minimal conditions to facilitate agreement and continue the reforms that have begun. And in order to ensure this, the FEC has proposed minimal functions that would provide the time and conditions for such an agreement to be reached.

Markovic then said that in these talks with republican governments the FEC is in fact conducting consultations to find out whether they favor a single convertible currency, whether we are going to have one or six structures of payment, whether there will be financial discipline within this and so on, rather than trying to convince the republics to adopt this.

This is a matter for the republican governments, as we believe that this requires the minimum that we included in our 11 proposed items. We have agreed that the FEC will present a roundup of these talks in the course of the next talks between the republican leaderships and the SFRY Presidency next Wednesday.

In his talks with the press, President of the Slovene government Lojze Peterle said that the FEC still assumes that everything is going to be done the old way until a new agreement in Yugoslavia is reached.

We maintain, however, Peterle told the journalists, that as early as the interim period one should switch to this minimum, bearing in mind developments and facts in Yugoslavia. To this effect we have prepared very concrete proposals and acquainted Prime Minister Markovic with them.

We advocate the decentralization of the federation's functions by transferring them to the republics and financing these activities by the republics. We agree with President Markovic and his delegation that this should be carried out in a peaceful and democratic way. We are

still persisting in offering the memorandum of the government of Slovenia on contributions, decentralization, and a minimum of functions in the interim period, Peterle said.

Asked about those issues on which they either disagree or agree with the FEC's proposal, Peterle said that they agree with the FEC's attitude on the convertibility of the dinar.

As far as monetary policies and the role of the National Bank are concerned, we support such conditions wherby control will be possible. As for the hard currency reserves, there are no problems. We are committed, of course, to a smooth functioning of financial transactions in the country and abroad, to the functioning of a single market, as put forward by the FEC, but we are asking ourselves how the FEC will bring this about. We do not agree to respect the existing conception of pooling the funds for financing the federation's functions within the agreed framework, because as far as we are concerned, this means the continuation of the old system.

We are in agreement when it comes to relating debt to maintaining personal and public expenditure within the established limits. There is no lack of agreement either on the necessity of continuing property restructuring, but we do not agree with the financial reorganization of the banking and financial systems at the federal level, because they need to be decentralized. We are also against social programs at the federal level. As for federal debts in the sphere of defense and state security, as well as international affairs, we are in favor of major rationalization in all these areas.

We think that this has not included all the aspects of the joint minimum functioning of the federation and we are yet to have talks about it, said Peterle.

Reportage on Arms Return in Slovenia

Jansa Doubts Army Intervention

AU1901165291 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Relja Atanasijevic report on Slovenia Territorial Defense Forces; place and date not given]

[Text] The arms that belong to the Territorial Defense forces of Slovenia are today where they were yesterday. They come from three sources. This was announced by Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa, who denied in a program on Slovene Television last night that Sandi Grubelic played the role of mediator or was a main actor in the importation of arms.

[Atanasijevic] According to Jansa, the armaments of the Slovene Army come from two domestic sources. The first are the warehouses of the Territorial Defense and the second are the supplies of heavy armaments and rockets stored by the republic in the Kocevje area. Special and antitank weapons are imported.

Because there has been some talk that Sandi Grubelic has been involved in purchasing foreign arms, Jansa stated that this information was incorrect and mentioned that Slovenia has its own channels for purchasing cheaper foreign arms, but he did not cite what these channels are. He said that it was true that his brother was employed in Trend [bankrupt car-rental firm that belonged to Grubelic] and that he now shared the fate of the workers in Grubelic's enterprise.

The republican defense minister announced that since last Spring, Slovenia and Croatia have been unable to acquire supplies of arms from Crvena Zastava. Jansa added that he meets with his colleagues from Croatia two or three times a month. The last meeting was held recently in Mokrice.

This obviously related to the SFRY Presidency order that all para-statal units surrender their arms. This does not relate, however, to Territorial Defense, Jansa said. He put forward the view that the present situation resembled the situation in December, and therefore, did not discount the possibility of certain pressure and provocation, but he mentioned that he did not believe in the possibility of intervention.

Use of Force Said Possible

AU1901204191 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 1830 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Friedrich Orter report]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Slovenia and Croatia have ignored the ultimatum to disarm their militia issued by the state presidium of Belgrade. The political leaderships of Zagreb and Ljubljana consider the threat of a military intervention not to be imminent at this moment. Slovenia's Interior Minister Igor Bavcar said that if somebody wants to solve political problems through the use of force, we will respond by using force.

Bavcar does not rule out the possibility that, in the shadow of the Gulf war, somebody might get such an idea. Bavcar stated that he believes, however, there are still many possibilities to prevent this and that the conflict can be settled in a peaceful and civilized way. [passage omitted]

JNA Magazine Views Croatian, Slovene Threats

LD1801060791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2040 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] Zagreb, Jan 17 (TANJUG)—The prevalent feeling in Yugoslavia is that the Army could take over the maintenance of peace and order in the country in view of the fact that the republics of Croatia and Slovenia have not yet complied with a decree issued by the state Presidency that all illegal paramilitary units be disarmed by Saturday.

JUGOSLOVENSKA ARMIJA, a magazine published by the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], says today there are

no indications that the authorities in Croatia and Slovenia will "renounce their illegal armed formations" and that they are now openly threatening to use them against the army units carrying out the Presidency's decree.

The disarmament decree is the last reasonable means to prevent a war (in Yugoslavia), the magazine warns.

It also says it believes that Croatian citizens "will not resist the Army" which, in the interest of peace, would have to execute the decree in place of the republican bodies.

The decree specifies that the Army will protect all Yugoslav citizens "if the other competent bodies are unable to do so".

A campaign for signing a "petition for peace", organized by mothers whose sons are now serving their Army terms, is under way in the Croatian capital Zagreb.

The mothers, whose petition collected 1,000 signatures this morning, appeal to the Army not to force their sons "to fire at their brothers, sisters and parents".

Croatian representatives yesterday asked Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic to urge the state Presidency to renounce a section of the decree giving the army the powers to maintain peace and order.

The mayor of Knin, a town in Croatia with a predominantly Serbian population, yesterday demanded the state Presidency that the army protect the Knin residents from "a possible attack by paramilitary formations of the Croatian Interior Ministry".

The Federal Defence Ministry said today that residents of Knin and other Serbian municipalities in Croatia were turning in arms, adding that it had no information on whether arms were being returned in other parts of Croatia.

Slovene, Croat Statement on Military 'Threats'

LD2201223191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1931 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—The Slovene Presidency, headed by President Milan Kucan, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman today discussed the political, security, and military situation in Yugoslavia. A detailed joint statement reiterates the stand that "both republics will in the future, too, press for a peaceful and democratic resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, and stated that all republics should determine through a dialogue the future shape of the joint life between the Yugoslav nations and states.

"It was proposed to the FEC [Federal Executive Council] to draft an agreement on the distribution of property and other entitlements and obligations currently held by federal bodies. It was also underlined that in the interim period—in other words until a new Yugoslav agreement is reached or until Yugoslavia disintegrates—the federal bodies, and above all the FEC, should carry out all functions necessary for securing a peaceful transition to new forms of joint or good-neighborly coexistence. Both sides support efforts of FEC President Ante Markovic, to help republics reach a joint agreement.

The statement notes that precisely now in the SFRY territory, especially in certain areas, the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] is undertaking activities that, as stated, "threaten a peaceful and democratic resolution of the crisis."

Calling the SFRY Presidency decree on the return of arms and the reading of the decree, the JNA "has introduced the highest degree of readiness in some units; transferring heavy armament units, and showing intention to undertake some state functions, whereby it has encroached upon the integrity and sovereignty of republics."

"The Slovene Presidency and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman assessed that certain JNA activities on SFRY territory are exerting obvious political and military pressure, which would bring about the deployment of JNA military might in the process of resolving the political crisis. The practice of constant military threats, against which both republics had already protested on several occasions, continues. The SFRY Presidency is obviously allowing the JNA to interfere in the political, peaceful and democratic resolution of the Yugoslav crisis," the statement notes, and goes on to add that such conduct "demands from us to reject such an Army role and, thereby, prevent violence that threatens the peaceful life of our people, democracy, and tolerant relations between our nations.

"The SFRY Presidency was once more asked to immediately put an end to all JNA activities that undermine the legal order established by republican constitutions and the SFRY Constitution, and especially the exercise of a peoples's right to self-determination in their republics.

"If the JNA is deployed, which would at odds with the order and measures imposed by legitimate republican authorities, the Slovene Presidency and the Croatian president will undertake measures in line with their constitutional powers. A complete agreement on this has been reached. The Slovene Presidency and the Croatian president will inform the Slovene and Croatian Assemblies about all possible measures," the statement concludes.

The office of the president of the Slovene Presidency issued the statement for the public from today's meeting between the Slovene Presidency and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

Army Continues Collecting Arms From Individuals

LD2201175491 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] An extraordinary session of the SFRY Presidency was held today in the federation palace in Belgrade. It

was also attended by Federal Executive Council President Ante Markovic and members of the federal government. Their attention was focused on the situation in the country in light of last night's expiration of the deadline for the return of weapons. A HINA statement that we have just received says:

All individuals who turned in illegally possessed weapons and army equipment before the deadline in accordance with the SFRY Presidency's order are completely absolved of any responsibility. All individuals who have disobeyed the order, however, and kept illegally obtained weapons in their possession after the deadline will be prosecuted for criminal offenses, it was decided at the SFRY presidency session in Belgrade today.

Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] bodies and institutions will continue to collect illegally obtained weapons from individuals, regardless of which part of Yugoslavia they come from.

The last sentence of the statement is anything but alarming. It says that today's decision refers exclusively to individuals and not to bodies of legally elected governments.

As we said earlier, the session was held in the federation palace; thanks to circumstances favorable for journalists, we can say something more about the Presidency's session before a detailed official statement is issued. Sonja Badel reports from Belgrade:

[Badel] News from the SFRY Presidency session is encouraging, especially for Croatian citizens who are apprehensively awaiting further developments following the deadline for handing in weapons in accordance with the SFRY Presidency's order. It has been learned that JNA bodies are not going to take any measures against bodies of legal governments. Their actions taken to implement the SFRY Presidency's order can only be directed against individuals who violate the law. All this is in accordance with the Constitution and laws—i.e. the JNA has no special powers.

Such a decision of the Presidency is based on the Presidency's order itself, which says that the need for disarmement does not refer to the police and YPA bodies It is widely known that yesterday, the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency called for an authentic interpretation of the order because it was obvious that the SFRY Presidency members have a different opinion on the motives and objectives of the order, and this can cause very unfavorable and even tragic consequences. An official statement will show the degree of success in overcoming these differencies.

The Presidency also examined the situation in the Gulf on the basis of a report presented by the government, i.e. the federal secretariats for foreign affairs and national defense, and supported all measures being taken by these bodies to protect the interests of the country and to set peace initiatives in motion.

Return of Arms in Kosovo Examined

AU1801122791 Skopje VLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 13 Jan 91 pp 1, 4

[Emin Azemi, Blerim Reka report: "Whom Did Hysen Kajdomcaj Represent in Belgrade?"]

[Text] Pristina, 12 Jan—The first "batch" of talks in the Palace of the Federation and the warnings of the disarmament of groups and individuals are being commented on in various ways in Kosovo. While the "Yugosummit" reinforced still more strongly the Kosovars' impression of a new farce on a distorted political stage, President Jovic's "threat" that he will disarm all forces that are in "opposition to the regulations and dispositions of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs" in Kosovo caused no surprise.

On the subject of surprises, let us merely mention that Kosovo's representation in the talks about a "historic agreement," or specifically Hysen Kajdomcaj's participation in these talks, caused many people in and beyond Kosovo to wonder: "Whom did he represent?" Such a question also surfaced in a press communique issued by branches of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance [DSK] in Switzerland and Germany, which expressed the view that Kajdomcaj's participation in the meeting was reminiscent of the 46-year-long contribution of the Kosovar leadership, which merely acted on the orders of Belgrade bodies.

Threats of Military Rule

Representatives of the Albanian political parties in Kosovo were among the first to come out with comments on the latest movements in the country's political and state capital. At its regular news conference, the DSK Presidium also did not remain indifferent to this political event, to the piratical intervention of Serbia in Yugoslavia's monetary system, or to President Jovic's latest threats of a fresh disarmament of some parts of Yugoslavia.

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, after repeating familiar demands for a restoration of constitutionality to Kosovo, the resumption of the normal work of the Kosovo Assembly and Executive Council and of the Albanian-language media, drew attention to Serbia's latest monetary scandal. For us Albanians, Rugova said, Serbia's intervention in Yugoslavia's monetary system—or rather its plunder—came as no surprise, because we see the Serbian government doing such things in Kosovo virtually every day. A symptomatic case was the printing of money in the name of the Bank of Kosovo, to which the federal bodies did not react, thus permitting the liquidation of the banking system in Kosovo, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova stressed. Meanwhile, speaking on the SFRY Presidency's most recent order for the disarmament of "illegitimate" units and individuals, Rugova said that this demand is equivalent to a threat of military rule. It is an amazing fact, he said, that it has been possible in

recent days to take away arms from Albanians who hold licenses, while they are given to Serbs and Montenegrins without licenses.

As for the start of talks among representatives of the federal units about the political future of Yugoslavia, the DSK leader said that Kosovo and we Albanians are being left to one side, and the DSK cannot accept this.

The fact that we are dealing with a major financial and currency scandal caused by the Serbian Assembly is evident from the most recent cases of the bankruptcy and closure of bank branches in Kosovo. After the Pristina branch, this fate befell the Bankkos branch in Djakovica, where the first step was the dismissal of 40 employees. The same fate will befall 30 other employees, who will remain in work until the end of March to complete the bank's bankruptcy procedure. All the managers, from the chief manager downward, have also been dismissed from their jobs. This means that this bank is in practice closed, because all work has stopped completely except for the completion of the bankruptcy procedure.

Faced with such a crisis, the Bankkos branch at Orahovac, which is the only one in the town and operates under Bankkos of Prizren, was placed under lock and key. This and the dismissal of the bank's employees was explained by the fact that a bankruptcy procedure has allegedly begun at the Bank of Kosovo. For this and other reasons, this bank was required to close its doors to its own account holders until the fate of the Bank of Kosovo and its employees is known; meanwhile, savings and other account holders may make inquiries at Jugobanka in Pristina.

Who Is Inciting the Radicalization of Violence in Kosovo

Citizens in Gnjilane and its surrounding district were summoned to public demonstration by some posters that referred to violence and armed conflict of various kinds. In reference to this, the Gnjilane branch of the DSK issued a public communique, informing its membership and the entire population that it was not behind this call. In such a currently unstable situation, the communique stated, such a demonstration could serve certain anti-Albanian circles to radicalize their violence, thus concealing the real causes of the crisis in the present regime.

As announced, a delegation of the European Democratic Union led by Dr. Andreas Kohl has arrived in Kosovo. The guests from Europe will try to discover in detail to what extent the resolution of the European Parliament on Kosovo is being acted on, and on their return they will report back to this high-level European forum. The delegation's members are expected to talk with representatives of the Albanian opposition in Kosovo and the Kosovo Independent Trade Unions.

With the aim of unblocking the Albanian-language Kosovo media, a group of Pristina Radio and Television and RILINDJA representatives talked with Darko Marin, federal information secretary, in Belgrade on 8 January. In this connection, the Pristina Radio and Television Coordinating Council issued a communique to the public stating among other things that the starting point for any possible dialogue on the resumption of the work of Pristina Radio and Television should be the referendum of 5 July, the federal information law, and the principles of the market economy. The Coordinating Council protested strongly at Pristina Television's film equipment being taken to Belgrade Television, allegedly on loan.

What happened to the Albanian-language programs of Pristina Radio and Television on 5 July was repeated yesterday at the People's Provincial Theater in Pristina, when the Serbian militia entered without the slightest pretext and took away by force the director Asllan Hasaj and the theater's other managers. According to a statement by Asllan Hasaj, the theater will not suspend its work, although it will operate with smaller groups of artists, so the theater will not abandon its work completely. Hasaj promised that the theater's actors will prepare productions of high artistic quality.

There is no end to the cases of the maltreatment of innocent Albanian citizens and violence used against them by the Serbian police. In the center of Pec, at about 0900 yesterday, the Serbian police raided the house of Shemsedin Agusholli, member of the Presidium of the Pec DSK branch. Two days before, the police had also seized this doctor's son Shpend, and have still not released him. It has been reported that two other Pec families were raided yesterday, under the now-familiar pretext of searching for weapons.

[The following passage appears boxed within the body of the item]

The Albanians Have No Reason To Be Disillusioned

The recently formed Pristina-based National Club for the Peaceful Democratization of the Albanians [Klubi Kombetar i Demokratizimit Paqesor te Shqiptareve] appeals to all the progressive public in Yugoslavia, Europe, and the world, to all political parties in Yugoslavia, and all Albanian political parties wherever they are, to raise the voice of reason and to protest against the efforts to reach an understanding for the new state organization of Yugoslavia without the participation of the Albanians.

The Albanian people in Yugoslavia are indigenous and the oldest of all the peoples in this state; they are the third largest of the nations that make up Yugoslavia; they live on their own lands and in a compact territory; they took part in the creation of the Yugoslav federation during and after the war. Any effort, therefore, to leave them without the full and equal political participation given to other peoples is illusory.

The Albanians in Yugoslavia have always been and remain a factor of peace and stability in Yugoslavia, the Balkans, and beyond. Because of serious discrimination, the Albanians in Yugoslavia are more vitally concerned

than others not to be left disillusioned by the so-called new process of democratization.

Europe, which bears responsibility for the martyrdom of the Albanians in the past, has the obligation not to allow others to once again make bargains at the Albanians' expense. There can be no peaceful and tranquil Yugoslavia or security in the Balkans and Europe, if the Albanian people are denied the right to be a political subject and the right to self-determination, the appeal concludes.

Muslim Assembly Denounces Demands in Kosovo

LD1601214291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1548 GMT 16 Jan 91

[Text] Sarajevo, 16 January (TANJUG)—We demand that natural and inalienable religious, political, cultural, social, and constitutional rights be restored to all the inhabitants of Kosovo, and in particular that the hampering of normal work of the institutions of the Islamic community in Kosovo be stopped immediately. This is stressed in a resolution on Kosovo adopted by the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Community in Yugoslavia.

The resolution denounces the Serbian Government decisions abolishing Kosovo's legitimate tools of administration, educational and health institutions, and information media, and the dismissal of Albanians from their places of work. In short, all the decisions that the resolution stresses, are directed against the honor, dignity, reputation, and life of the Albanians.

The resolution of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Community calls on "all people of goodwill in Yugoslavia and in the world to engage in dawa [prayer] and provide moral and material aid to prevent the apartheid systematically perpetrated on the Albanian Muslim population in Kosovo.

"In particular we are calling on all followers of Islam to express their solidrarity with the Muslims in Kosovo, and to regard this as their Islamic duty and human solidarity," stresses this resolution.

Mitkov Advocates 'Full Equality' in Negotiations

AU2001202191 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 91 p 3

[TANJUG report: "Insistence on Equality"]

[Text] Skopje, 11 January—The Socialist Republic of Macedonia is committed to preserving Yugoslavia, whose future will be agreed upon by its sovereign republics. In this sense, it opposes all ways of undermining and destroying Yugoslavia, like the blocking and demolition of the credit-monetary system and the entire financial system with one-sided and unlawful measures taken by individual republics. This was said by Vladimir Mitkov, president of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, at yesterday's session of the SFRY Presidency, while presenting this republic's stands on the future of Yugoslavia.

As a sovereign democratic state, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia will insist on full equality among republics in creating a new agreement. It opposes all attempts to gain supremacy and a majority in interethnic relations and, in this sense, it cannot accept any forms of unitarism, hegemonism, centralism, or possible forms of a reduced or asymmetric federation and so on. Mitkov stressed that any method for determining mutual relations is unacceptable if the statehood and sovereignty of republics and the country's internal borders are thereby brought into question.

Tupurkovski Speaks on Presidency's Role

AU2001201191 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 91 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Talk Without Prejudices"]

[Text] Belgrade—TANJUG yesterday received from the office of Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski, member of the SFRY Presidency, the shorthand notes of the speech that Tupurkovski made at the session of the SFRY Presidency that was held on 10 January to discuss the country's political future.

Macedonia's position will be very clear as regards the defense of its vital interests, but also regarding respect for the interests of others and the quest for only generally-acceptable answers, solutions, and models, Dr. Tupurkovski said, among other things.

I am personally convinced that we will talk, without prejudice, with everyone and that everyone should hold talks in this way and on every possible solution, also without prejudice, in which respect it is not necessary to underscore the need for equality, because otherwise these talks will not even happen.

I said I would say more about the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Regarding the Presidency of Yugoslavia and its role, I have always thought that arbitration by the Presidency of Yugoslavia is a delicate matter and even that this is a dangerous step and, in any case, risky. I have seen our role, and I see it today, in the harmonization of relations, although I do not think that we have been successful in these activities of ours. The duties that the SFRY Presidency has, however, which are based on its constitutional and even realistic status, if you like, should be performed, but they should be performed with political realism. The republics' attitude to the Presidency of Yugoslavia should also be based on such political realism.

I would place as a joint category in this political realism, the possibility of Yugoslavia existing as a functioning system until a future agreement is reached, and I think that this should be accepted as an obligation. One should not only reach a political consensus on this, even though

we cannot do anymore in this field as regards respect for the constitution and laws because we have suspended them, but this should be understood as an obligatory category, if we at all insist on or have ambitions to reach some kind of generally-acceptable agreement.

I personally agree with all the forms of dialogue that have been proposed today. I think that it is clear what the subjects of these talks are and what powers they have. No one is excluding anyone else nor is anyone excluded from this process of negotiation. I interpret the proposals in this way. I believe that we will all be realistic.

I agree with the proposal from Vice President Mesic that considering the time, some kind of minimum agreement should be reached, Tupurkovski said.

Another thing is how to survive what is going on now, Tupurkovski mentioned, again asking to speak.

Both on 27 December and today, all the participants, almost without exception, claimed that the system must be reintegrated, at least on some minimal bases.

One should, therefore, support the proposal of the president of the Federal Executive Council that the Federal Executive Council and republican governments should reach agreement on this minimum and that we support this today. This should be one conclusion.

So I do not say more, I think that the problem of the breach of monetary policy and the monetary system is also on the agenda, Tupurkovski said.

Macedonian Presidential Candidate Fails To Win

LD1901205291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1732 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Text] Skopje, January 19 (TANJUG)—Kiro Gligorov, the only candidate for president of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority of votes at today's session of the republican multiparty parliament. Although expected to win, Gligorov won only 60 out of the 120 votes cast by all deputies present and voting.

The well-known economist, "shadow counsellor" of Prime Minister Markovic and one of the main architects of all postwar economic reforms, was proposed as candidate by the Macedonian reformed communists.

Deputies of the National Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-VRMO, who won the first postwar multiparty election in Macedonia last November, did not vote for Gligorov.

Deputies of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, which advocates the interests of ethnic Albanians, also withheld their support.

The Macedonian parliament will meet next on January 25.

Montenegro Denies Existence of Paramilitary Units

AU2201115191 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GTM 22 Jan 91

[Text] Paramilitary or other illegaly armed formations do not exist in Montenegro, and therefore arms obtained in an illegal way do not exist either.

This was stated to TANJUG by Colonel Vlado Boljevic, minister of national defense of Montenegro.